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Abstract 
Threats to personal payment card information are continually on the rise. To implement a 
formal process for protecting this information PCI DSS was created. However credit card 
fraud is still rising. This leads to the question of whether or not PCI DSS is effective in 
protecting this data. This dissertation implements the 12 PCI DSS 3.0 requirements and tests 
the effectiveness in regard to the complexity of implementation. 
While there are clearly issues within the standard: existing ambiguities, speed of adapting to 
industry findings: the main issue with the standard is not with the standard itself but with a 
failure to comply and still accepting electronic payments.  The self-assessment options as 
found in testing would have left many network vulnerabilities that would remain 
undiscovered without full standard implementation.  
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1. Introduction 
Key trend indicators from industrial sources have tracked the progressive escalation in 
security incidents worldwide (Trustwave, 2013; Verizon, 2013; PWC, 2014; Ponemon, 2014).  
Both the domestic end-user and contemporary computing professional are faced with 
persistent threats to their personal data in today's Internet enabled world.  The existing 
principles about which security is oriented such as confidentiality, integrity and availability 
face considerable challenges. From its inception, the Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standards (PCI DSS) was established as a means of securing payment card information and 
there has been considerable debate as regards the effectiveness. With the continual rise of 
security breaches drawing attention to PCI DSS, the effectiveness of the standard is under 
much debate. With many large companies such as Target suffering security breaches the 
level of protection offered by the standard has come under question (Plato, 2014) 
Malicious attacks of increasing sophistication and complexity are hampering today’s security 
professionals and while no single methodology, technology or attitude shift will ensure 
security, it is recommended that a defence in-depth strategy is adopted.  Central to this 
strategy is the PCI DSS framework which, if properly implemented, can offer an 
organization, institution or end-user a much needed layer of support to help mitigate for the 
scale of attacks currently experienced.  This thesis offers considerable insight into the 
application of PCI DSS by testing its strength on an experimental but compliant network 
built to accept secure payment card information.  The literature review focuses on the 
history of PCI DSS and why it is a necessary and progressive component of today’s 
contemporary security infrastructures. 
1.1 Purpose 
The strengths and weaknesses of PCI DSS 3.0 will be tested with a view to proposing some 
potential mitigation techniques.  While PCI DSS 3.0 aims to provide a further level of clarity 
than its predecessors, ambiguity in its communication can have a detrimental impact 
particularly as regards its implementation which is critical in successfully obtaining 
compliance.  Therefore, the primary focus of this thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the 
standard with special reference to the complexity of the implementation process. 
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1.2 Background 
When a business accepts credit card payments, whether online or in a physical environment 
the retailer is required to be PCI DSS compliant. PCI DSS was originally developed by Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express and JBC to help protect sensitive payment card information. 
Since the standards original release in 2004 data breaches and credit card fraud have been 
rapidly increasing. The effectiveness for PCI DSS 3.0 is essential to protect sensitive 
information. 
With the standard being of such importance an evaluation of its strengths, weaknesses and 
implementation process is necessary.  With the threat of data breaches continuously on the 
rise (Sullivan, 2013) it is not enough to blindly trust a security standard; therefore the 
standard requires in-depth review and assessment. 
1.3 Outline of Report 
Chapter 2 Literature review  
Chapter 3 Requirements design  
Chapter 4 Methodology 
Chapter 5 Testing 
Chapter 6 Conclusion, limitations and suggestions for further research 
1.4 Research Question 
Is PCI DSS 3.0 an effective method of protecting cardholder data? Is the rise of data 
breaches due to weaknesses in the standard or to a lack of implementation? 
1.5 Research Objectives 
 Build and secure a network with web server to accept payment card information  
 Test the security measures in place with penetration tests 
 Assess and secure any weaknesses found 
 Evaluation of the strength of PCI DSS 3.0 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Considerable debate surrounding the effectiveness of the PCI DSS has highlighted the 
importance of clarity regarding documentation and implementation procedures (Kedgley, 
2014). Since the release of PCI DSS 3.0 in 2013 there is a dearth of information in this 
respect.  What follows is a review of the history and evolution of PCI DSS, its importance and 
data breaches.  
2.2 The History and Evolution of PCI DSS 
2.2.1 The Founding and Early Conceptions of the PCI Model 
Prior to the release of PCI DSS, payment card industries comprising of Mastercard, Visa, 
American Express, JCB and Discover relied upon individual policies regarding the safe 
processing and storage of payment card data.  This created significant challenges as regards 
an integrated approach to the issues surrounding PCI. Prior to the initial release of the 
standard the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council was founded, the PCI 
Security Standards Council combined these individual policies resulting in the release of PCI 
DSS version 1.0 in December 2004 (Roebuck, 2012). As a result, procedures were put in 
place to mitigate for sensitive payment card data being breached by ensuring merchants 
who accept this data are both aware of and enforce the necessary security measures 
(Chuvakin & Williams, 2011).  
Early documentation from the American Bar Association (2008) and some more recent 
research from Chuvakin and Williams (2011) and Bakay et al, (2014) suggested that a 
climate of growing concern surrounding the protection of sensitive credit card data led to 
the PCI DSS being devised by MasterCard and Visa to alleviate concerns surrounding the 
safe handling of cardholder data in a practical step by step process (American Bar 
Association, 2008, Bakay et al, 2014).  An important feature driving the initial stages of the 
standard’s creation was the need for compliance and the importance of clarity within its 
process and documentation.  This early phase of the standards creation contained 
numerous flaws subsequently rectified by version 1.2.1, version 1.2.1 had many 
requirement additions to address these issues, providing more guidance on wireless 
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technologies, virtualisation and encryption methods, resulting in a higher level of security 
than its predecessor (Bhargav, 2014). However, PCI DSS version 2 became the industry 
standard in active use until December 2014. 
2.2.2 PCI DSS 2.0 
In 2010, PCI DSS 2.0 was released and became the industry standard in 2011.  While PCI DSS 
2.0 did not introduce major changes from PCI DSS 1.2.1, it contained more subtle and 
practical enhancements which more appropriately dealt with technological advances and 
how security should be approached.  Research by Chuvakin and Williams (2011) 
documented these differences, highlighting important changes particularly as regards 
wireless networks such as WEP authentication which was no longer deemed acceptable, the 
introduction of virtualization and a significant change in outlook as regards the 
implementation of risk management.  Figure 1 below shows an example of how the PCI 
Security Standards Council charted the evolution of the standard from PCI DSS 1.2.1 to PCI 
DSS 2.0.  
 
Figure 1: PCI Security Standards Council (2010) requirements evolution 
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As useful as this standard was in its initial stages, weaknesses in PCI DSS 2.0 began to 
emerge that may be still be prevalent in the updated standard.  For example, Blackwell 
(2008) noted the importance of auditing in organizations and warns that it may be bypassed 
via physical access which employees have to many critical systems.  Responding to this, PCI 
Security Standards Council included important guidelines for requirements and resources 
that may be used when determining potential weaknesses (PCI Security Standards Council, 
2013).  For those companies that are compliant with PCI DSS 2, these guidelines, while 
welcome, lack details as regards implementation and other sources are required.  For 
example, the standard highlights those areas prone to security breaches along with aiding 
merchants to adapt their systems so that implementation is more readily achieved to gain 
compliance.  While the PCI Security Standards Council (2013) effectively describes the aims 
of PCI DSS they do not provide sufficient research or merchant feedback on the success 
levels of these aims.  
2.2.3 PCI DSS 3.0 
PCI DSS 3.0 was released in November 2013 but will not be in full effect until 1st of January 
2015. Due to the fact that PCI DSS 3.0 is not yet in full effect, information on the 
effectiveness of very limited. However, Chuvakin and Williams (2014) while providing 
insights into all previous versions also stay up to date with the standard releasing an 
updated edition of ‘PCI Compliance’ to take into account the implementation changes in the 
new standard. Keeping the same structure as the other editions previously mentioned, this 
provides a useful guide for measuring the scope of PCI DSS 3.0 and provides useful 
implementation techniques.  
While Shihab and Misdianti (2014) do not focus on implementing PCI DSS 3.0 from the 
beginning like Chuvakin and Williams (2014), they do provide recommendations on updating 
network from a previous PCI version to PCI DSS 3.0. Shihab and Misdianti (2014) further 
their research by providing a break-down of the requirement changes, providing a list of 
requirements that are necessary when updating to the new standard. This is very useful as it 
separates out clarifications and evolving requirements, providing a concise list of changes 
that will need to be made to network to update to PCI DSS 3.0. 
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Identified Problems with PCI DSS 3.0 
Kedgley (2014) states there are no stark contrasts between PCI DSS 3.0 and its predecessor. 
While PCI compliance is a requirement for merchants taking credit card payments data 
breaches are still increasing, Kedgley (2014) asks are the subtle changes in PCI DSS 3.0 
enough to reduce online credit card fraud? This is reiterated by explaining that the 
clarifications in the new standard seem to be of greater importance than strengthening 
mitigation techniques and that more than clarifications must be implemented to 
successfully protect card holder data. While Kedgley (2014) does provide a document that 
offers a well detailed standpoint on the new standard, as there currently is still a dearth of 
information on PCI DSS 3.0 there is little documentation to concrete or dispute this view.  
While the argument made by Kedgley is logical there is no data to back up the hypothesis. 
PCI DSS 3.0 is a clarification on PCI DSS 2.0 as can be seen from the list provided by the PCI 
Security Standards Council (2013), however this does not mean that there are no changes 
between the standards, and it may be premature to write off the effectiveness of the 
standard at such an early stage.  
While implementing PCI DSS 3.0 involves technical complexity it is not the only issue facing 
businesses implementing the standard.  Lovric and Sedinic (2013) also evaluate the financial 
implications of gaining PCI DSS compliance. A network is built for a fictitious company ‘The 
First Company Inc.’ and a study on implementing PCI DSS as well as ISO/IEC 2700 is 
undertaken for the methodology.  Lovric and Sedinic (2013) also outline the specifications of 
the First Company Inc. stating that it processes more than 1 million credit card transactions 
per annum.  The findings show that to achieve compliance would have a financial impact of 
up to $250,000.  This provides a severe financial impact, and for smaller industries may be 
unfeasible.  This document is particularly useful as it takes a different angle of research by 
not studying effectiveness or efficiency but rather the financial implications which is of great 
importance to merchants.  
2.3 The Importance of the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
2.3.1 Protecting Data 
Recent research from Atay et al (2014) and Grobler et al (2014) highlighted the prevalence 
and rapid adoption of credit card payments online with the concordant importance of how 
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the payment card industry has dealt with the protection of cardholder data. Of significant 
concern were the growing incompatibilities between the PCI standard and the diversity of 
vendors’ systems and networks.  While there is continuing research being conducted to 
mitigate for data breaches in both the public and private sector, PCI DSS remains the only 
officially implemented standard to specifically protect credit card holder data (Grobler et al, 
2014).  Highlighting the importance of effective security to protect cardholder data, Kedgley 
(2014) reported that while the total value of card payment transactions exceeds $21trillion 
annually, this is unfortunately overshadowed by losses in excess of $11billion due to 
fraudulent transactions.  This emphasises the importance of the PCI DSS standards since, to 
date, this is the only payment security standard enforced today. Therefore, its effectiveness 
is paramount if the protection of cardholders’ data is to be a priority.  Non-compliance to 
these standards faces considerable financial penalties. 
2.3.2 Implications of Non-Compliance 
PCI DSS is not only important in terms of protecting data; there are consequences for non-
compliance. Kidd (2008) discusses the effects of non-compliance where vendors who are 
found to be non-compliant after a breach are subject to fines and/or the implementation of 
restrictions as regards taking further credit card payments online. An important matter is 
highlighted in this respect since not only can non-compliance result in fines of up to 
$500,000 for each individual breach (Douthit and Huang, 2008), the loss of consumer 
confidence can have a significant negative impact upon the reputation of a firm to be found 
non-compliant.   Beyond the standards, requirements and recommendations there are legal 
and regulatory frameworks already in place to deal with data protection. 
2.3.3 Lack of Understanding 
Contrary to the importance of the standard, there is a lack of understanding for the need of 
PCI compliance among merchants and their employees, particularly in regards to previous 
versions. As industry research shows (Trustwave, 2013; Verizon, 2013; PWC, 2014; 
Ponemon, 2014) non-compliance is the main cause of data breaches, and lack of awareness 
and understanding seemed to be the main factor in regards to non-compliance. However 
PCI DSS 3.0 aims to alleviate this confusion by enforcing training methods for staff in the 
updated requirements (Mehta, 2014). This awareness is essential for improving security 
when handling sensitive payment card data.  
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2.4 PCI DSS and Legislation 
Accepting the PCI DSS requirements, merchants must also by aware of other legislation 
which may have an impact on their implementation.  Andress (2014) goes to considerable 
efforts to note that the necessary legislation may be divided by jurisdiction thus providing 
the merchant an easier means of identifying those which are most important for their 
particular business.  Of some value then is the Governance, Risk Management and 
Compliance (GRC) framework which takes an international perspective surrounding the 
enforcement of measures to ensure all required standards and legislations are met along 
with legal implications (Gordon, 2015).  For example in Ireland, the framework provides a 
mechanism to take into consideration the Data Protection Act (DPA) (2011) and furthermore 
at a European level via the ‘Electronic Communications Networks and Services Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Regulations’ which stipulates that consumers are made aware 
and give permission to allow their data to be stored (Morgan & Boardman, 2012).    
Within the context of increasing security trends indicating the escalation of data breeches 
specifically targeting consumer data (Trustwave, 2013; Verizon, 2013; PWC, 2014; Ponemon, 
2014) it is important to recognise the importance of the 2011 DPA when building and an e-
commerce website within compliance regulations. 
2.5 Data Breaches 
The data gathered by Sullivan (2013) from 2005 to 2010  regarding the prevalence of attacks 
leveraged against organisations storing sensitive payment card data reveals the heavy 
financial impact of data breaches (see Figure 2). While the statistics are dated as only take 
into account up until 2010, Sullivan (2013) provides great detail on the financial impact that 
incurs from a data breach, but furthermore shows details of many high-level breaches like 
that of TJX that spurred changes in the standard.  Of some concern is the worrying trend to 
sell the information extracted to perpetrate fraud.  The cost of a data breach outweighs the 
cost of compliance and with credit card breaches.  On this basis, it is important to note that 
PCI DSS 3.0 must provide comprehensive assurance to merchants and consumers alike.  
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Figure 2: Data Breach Statistics (Sullivan, 2013) 
While Sakharova (2012) does not provide the in-depth statistics provided by Sullivan (2013), 
there are figures provided on the use of credit cards. While these are based in the U. S. it 
does show the rise of debit and credit cards use.  Sakharova (2012) utilises figures released 
from the U.S. Census Bureau which state that in 2008 there were approximately 176 million 
credit card users and 181 million debit card holders, with these numbers constantly rising. 
This illustrates the need for effective security standards given the volume of payment card 
data, highlighting the impact that payment card fraud has on industry costing $8.6 billion 
per annum and rising.   
2.6 Implementing the Standard 
Aside from the standard requirements released by the PCI Security Standards Council there 
is a lack of literature on the implementation process for PCI DSS 3.0. Bhargav (2014) 
provides a guide on implementing PCI DSS 3.0 with information on each requirement and 
how to effectively implement these to achieve compliance.  Due to the lack of information 
on PCI DSS 3.0 this guide is a well-written and concise resource that provides a walk through 
guide to the implementation process.  
While Johnson (2014) does not aim to provide a definitive guide on the implementation of 
PCI DSS 3.0 he does provide insight into the more difficult issues of the implementation 
process. Johnson (2014) details the difficulty of network segmentation as required by the 
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new standard. Another difficulty highlighted by Johnson (2014) is the added complexity of 
the encryption standards necessary, as in PCI DSS 3.0 it is required to also encrypt sensitive 
information at rest. This is a valuable resource that will be utilised when evaluating the 
complexity of the implementation process. Johnson also provides a clear guide on IT 
security best practices and is a valuable resource as many of these best practices are used in 
the implementation process for PCI DSS 3.0. 
Chuvakin and Williams (2011) discuss the implementation process for PCI DSS 2.0 which will 
no longer be in effect from 1st of January 2014. Despite this, a checklist is provided for 
business which is particularly useful for the planning stages of the compliance process. 
Chuvakin and Williams (2011) detail the importance of training staff to reduce the likelihood 
of a data breach to ensure that compliance can be maintained at all managerial and 
administrative levels of an organisation. While this document was published for PCI DSS 2.0 
the point that is made is still valid as education will always be a form of data breach 
mitigation.  
PCI DSS 3.0 requirements 6.5.1 to 6.5.10 do not directly reference the Owasp top ten, this 
list provides an extensive resource on how to implement these PCI DSS 3.0 standards. 
Owasp (2014) provides mitigation techniques for these top ten weaknesses but many other 
techniques that should be considered good practice. Owasp is invaluable as it provides clear 
descriptions of the weaknesses, how these weaknesses can be targeted and mitigation 
techniques for data breaches and attacks. The Owasp top ten list provides in depth details 
on injection attacks, session authentication and management, cross-site scripting, direct 
object referencing, security misconfiguration, data exposure, function level access controls, 
CSRF attacks, component vulnerabilities and un-validated redirects and forwards (Owasp, 
2014).  Owasp is a vital resource and provides mitigation techniques for the listed attack 
types across a range of coding disciplines recommended for not only PCI DSS 3.0 but 
implementing best practiced for secure coding techniques.  
2.7 PCI DSS and the Security Community 
As shown, the evolution and progression of PCI DSS has been well documented, there is an 
area of research that has been yet to be addressed, the debate on the effectiveness and 
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reliability of the standard.  While it is clear that the need for such a standard is paramount, 
there are those who believe that the state of the current standard is not enough. 
Jeffrey Hall (2014) highlights issues within the standard, many obtaining compliance for 
compliance sake, rather than focusing on obtaining an adequate layer of security. While not 
negating the importance of the standard, or what it aims to achieve, the main obstacle is 
the human element. The implementation complexity can lead to unreliable testing 
procedures and monitoring. However, Hall (2014) does provide a balanced argument, 
security is not absolute, it is mitigation. For PCI DSS to provide a higher mitigation level an 
active approach to security needs to be undertaken, going beyond the minimal scope of the 
standard. 
Shier (2014) iterates this point further, providing views both on the successes and failures of 
the standard the defining point made is that PCI DSS is not a failsafe security standard. 
When storing sensitive data, merely achieving compliance is not enough. Shier (2014) states 
that PCI DSS should be used as a security baseline and not be seen as the holy grail of 
security. Another integral point is the self-assessment element. Should a company that is 
being trusted by the consumer to store their private data be the ones that determine the 
effectiveness of the security measures they have in place? 
While Hulme (2009) presents a well-grounded article on the PCI DSS it is based on the 
predecessor to PCI DSS 3.0, however the points made are still relevant. The argument 
presented like both Hall (2014) and Shier (2014) is not dismissive of the standard. It is clear 
that a standard to protect sensitive information needs to be implemented, however the 
issue that Hulme (2009) presents is that compliance is not security. In contrast to building a 
service and then trying to enforce compliance it is essential that companies instead enforce 
security during the build. Comprehensive coding, testing and logging should be developed. 
PCI DSS should not be the overall aim; instead as part of a secure builds PCI DSS should 
naturally be implemented.  
2.8 PCI DSS 3.0 and Security Education 
In the research conducted by Coburn (2010) the importance of education to not only 
achieve but also maintain compliance is well documented. The importance of education as a 
culture is also discussed, while this importance is mainly discussed as part of PCI DSS 
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lifecycle it is also recommended to create a culture of education for all security and 
technological needs. Coburn (2010) effectively shows how vital training is, as once 
compliance has been achieved it also needs to be maintained, educating employees in 
acceptable procedures and best practice techniques is integral for compliance.  
PCI DSS 3.0 introduces a more education focused approach to security. While not focused 
on PCI DSS education, NIST successfully highlights the importance of education frameworks 
in the entirety of IT security.   The outlook on education is not only provided from an IT 
perspective but also from a business perspective, not only for protecting consumers’ details, 
but company resources, information and reputability. NIST goes even further in depth, 
providing education frameworks that focus on understanding based education. It is not 
simply enough to inform staff about security practices. For security to be implemented 
effectively security professionals must not only understand the implementation but also the 
purpose (Guttman and Roback, 1995). Even though published in 1995 and in such a fast 
paced and evolving industry, the importance of a progressive and continuous education 
model is recommended by many contemporary security professionals.  
Kamala et al (2012) further the point made by Hall (2014) previously, that the human factor 
and poor understanding lead to vulnerabilities. However, Kamala et al (2014) also provide 
business justification for education. Both education and security are expensive, but with the 
growing threat of sensitive data being compromised the loss of business due to reputation 
and re-configuration post breach is even more detrimental. While constant training can not 
only be a monetary issue, it can also be tedious for staff. A study on different business 
sectors showed that the most effective methodology for maintaining successful training 
programs is an environment of reward and results based encouragement.  
While this source does not directly refer to PCI DSS and the standards educational 
requirements, it does provide an extensive analysis of education in the IT security industry 
as a whole. Alshomrani (2012) discusses the vital need for security education in the IT 
industry. This is partly due to the fact that many coding experts may not be aware of 
potential security risks that may be introduced into source code, but also as the security 
industry needs evolve at such a high rate it is imperative that IT professionals be aware of 
emerging threats. Alshomrani (2012) also provides resources that can be utilised to ensure 
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security education, many of which directly influence PCI DSS, such as network and coding 
security certifications.  
2.9 The Future of PCI DSS 
PCI DSS is constantly evolving, with new revisions and version being constantly updated 
through its lifecycle. PCI DSS follows a three year lifecycle, meaning that the longest time 
one version of the standard will be in full effect for is a three year period (Chuvakin & 
Williams, 2014; PCI Security Standards Council, 2010). As technologies rapidly evolve PCI DS 
will need to address these. For example, with the growth of mobile technologies PCI DSS 3.0 
does make greater reference to mobile to its predecessor, however these are still minor 
references in requirements 1 and 11. As these technologies grow PCI DSS may have to 
further and adapt the scope of the standard to allow for this (Chuvakin & Williams, 2014). 
At the moment, PCI DSS is not legislation, even though there are penalties for non-
compliance, one opinion is that PCI DSS will evolve to become law, so when a merchant 
decides to take payment card information they will be legally obliged to enforce the 
standard  (Carpenter, 2010). Given the link between PCI DSS and the both EU and US privacy 
legislations this is a logical step in the evolution of the standard.  
2.10 Conclusion 
PCI DSS was developed to aid in alleviating growing concerns for private data utilised for 
credit card payments and as noted by Grobler et al (2014) it is important that these 
standards be highly effective given that they are the only existing formal standard in place 
for protecting credit card holder data. On this basis, PCI DSS 3.0 needs to be a significant 
deterrent to malicious intent and effectively protect sensitive data. The importance of the 
standard and documentation of its evolution is well written and can be easily accessed, 
however, Sullivan (2013) does show the rise of online credit card fraud and the economic 
impact of data breaches. This shows that even though PCI DSS is a required standard, either 
it is not being fully enforced or the standard is not effective enough to mitigate for data 
breaches.  The key value of the work presented here is the in-depth study of PC DSS which 
represents a significant contribution to the field of PCI DSS 3.0 compliance.  
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3. Requirements Specification 
3.1 Introduction 
The primary focus of this thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the PCI DSS 3.0 standard, 
given the lack of research regarding an effective implementation method to achieve 
compliance; the methodology and implementation process will provide an important 
contribution to the literature surrounding PCI compliance.  Coburn (2010) and Alshomrani 
(2012) emphasised the need for effective security training and while Kedgley (2014) noted 
that there were no significant differences PCI DSS 3.0 and its predecessor, this should not 
prevent a continuing education programme from developing. Considerable difficulties are 
faced by the security professional as regards PCI DSS implementation given the diversity of 
organizational activities, the products and services offered and their awareness of security 
processes.  To date, no automated solutions exist which might make the job of PCI 
compliance more efficient; however PCI DSS may not lend itself to automation.  This section 
will outline the specification requirements necessary to build a PCI DSS 3.0 compliant 
network for testing. The requirements for this network include a switch, web server, router 
and multiple firewalls for DMZ implementation.  This will be followed by the integration of a 
fully functioning e-commerce website linked to the host web server as a testing platform to 
establish the efficacy of PCI DSS 3.0.  
3.2 Network Design 
To establish a baseline for compliance and to rigorously test the effectiveness of PCI DSS 3.0, 
it is necessary to test on a compliant network and website.  It is important to note that for 
PCI DSS 3.0 network compliance, segregation is key. To accomplish this the network design 
is that of a switched network which will consist of three separate switches to achieve the 
level of segregation necessary. One switch will host the internal LAN, another for the CDE 
and another for the DMZ. The LAN switch will host three separate business units which are 
set up on their own separate VLANs simulating a small/medium business.  The access 
granted on any network should be the minimum necessary to fulfil the functions of its users. 
In this regard, the LAN design here consists of admin, sales and production with 
administrative users having a higher level of access. There will also be an Apache web server 
implemented that will be contained in the DMZ and protected via firewall.  The database 
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server that will contain the sensitive payment information will be hosted on the CDE switch 
also protected with configured firewalls.  For network connectivity each switch via routers, 
the CDE and LAN will both connect to the outside world via the DMZ but will have no 
contact with each other. Figure 3 below details the full network design with the IP 
addressing; the DMZ and CDE are to be configured with minimal hosts per subnet to aid in 
preventing exploitation of open ports. 
 
Figure 3: Full Network Design for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Testing 
With a network design established testing the network will require the use of specialised 
tools to capture the network state for further analysis. 
3.3 Network Tools 
3.3.1 VSphere 
Due to financial constraints the acquisition of all the physical hardware necessary for full 
network implementation is unfeasible. The network build will be completed utilising 
VSphere and VMWare Workstation 11. There are considerable advantages associated with 
VSphere such as the ability to set up virtualised networking including switch configuration 
and implementation, the prioritization of access to network resources based on business 
rules and load balancing features. The primary feature of significant value to this work is the 
network snapshot component which captures the network state and can be used for 
reverting or comparing previous development states.  
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3.3.2 Client, Server and Database OS 
Both the server and database will utilize Ubuntu Server with Apache as the web server 
combined with a MySQL database server for storing of sensitive data. This configuration 
allows full Lampp stack implementation or installing single aspects. This aspect is useful as 
the web and database server functionality can be segregated without taking up valuable 
resources.  Due to resource limitations, the open source client desktop images in the 
business unit VLANs will be implemented as Linux Ubuntu desktops. 
3.3.3 Firewalls 
Standard guides surrounding PCI DSS compliance requires the implementation of firewalls 
(Chuvakin and Williams, 2011; Bhargav, 2014; Johnson 2014).  Using these 
recommendations as a baseline, ClearOS will be utilised as an external facing firewall with 
Smoothwall configured with router and firewall functionality in the internal LAN and CDE.  
Best practices indicate that a combination of supporting systems is a more robust solution 
rather than a singular source, in this respect different firewall systems will be deployed in 
this network so that limitations in one firewall are overcome by advantages in other.   
3.3.4 Router 
ClearOS as well as offering Firewall functionality can also be used as a network router. 
ClearOS also supports VLAN routing so allows communication between VLANs but also 
allows ACLs to be applied to the communications. ClearOS also has the capability to link 
virtualised network to physical ISP routers, providing the network with internet access. 
3.4 Website Implementation 
Due to code complexity the network build and the time constraints of the project the 
website build will consist of obtaining an ecommerce website.  To choose the code base that 
would be utilised for the project, two commercial code bases are tested along with one 
open source code base, Opencart (2015) version 2.0.2.0. The code base for each cart is 
tested with a static code scan; see Appendix A for full scan results. While the two 
commercial projects were advertised as PCI DSS compliant many weaknesses were found in 
the code base, all three contained MD5 hashing algorithms along with insecure php coding 
techniques. While OpenCart also had these weaknesses, it is an open source code base that 
is permissive of modification and was chosen for the ecommerce functionality. The code 
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base for OpenCart will be secured in the methodology section of the dissertation. When 
utilising open source in industry there are implications that must be considered. Some 
license types like the MIT and Free BSD License are very permissive, allowing redistribution 
and modification, however some other license types referred to as copyleft license types 
contain a clause that if modification and distribution occur all code must be donated back to 
the open source community (Yingkui , et al., 2010).  
3.5 Compliance Testing 
The systems development life cycle (SDLC) is widely used throughout the IT industry and 
while considerable debate surrounding its configuration will continue (McMurtrey, 2013) its 
ability to adapt and evolve in established and some emergent environments makes it an 
ideal choice to integrate full compliance testing.  While the network will be built utilising a 
SDLC to ensure security is kept at the forefront of the project, upon completion of the 
network build and implementation of the website full compliance will be tested.  
3.6  Testing of the Standard 
3.6.1 Kali 
Maintained and funded by Offensive Security Ltd, Kali is a digital forensics and penetration 
testing suite that offers over 700 penetration tools accumulating in a powerful testing suite 
(Binder and Broad, 2003).  The issue met was narrowing down the available options 
provided by Kali to a concise list including: 
1. Metasploit - an open source software that offers many features that will be utilized in 
the testing phase. As it can be used on networks, devices and web applications it will be 
valuable during penetration testing.  
2. Nikto - this is a powerful vulnerability scanning tool that will be utilised to assess 
vulnerabilities on the webserver and hosted site. Nikto is continually updated so 
contains details of new means of network exploitation.  
3. Nmap - a versatile tool that will assist in assessing many of the aspects of PCI DSS 3.0. 
Nmap will be utilized to assess the strength of firewall configurations and any IP filters 
that may be on the network. Furthermore Nmap can gain vital information about the 
physical network. This tool has the ability to port scan and gain data on operating 
systems and network protocols.  
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4. Aircrack specializes in accessing WLAN data and breaking WEP and WPA keys. This is a 
very useful tool when attempting to infiltrate a network. Aircrack uses ARP packets to 
gain information on both WEP and WPA keys.  
5. Wireshark – Wireshark is a network packet analyser which captures network packets 
and displays packet data as detailed as possible; in particular, the ability to capture live 
network traffic combined with filtering systems that will be useful to focus on specific 
protocols such as SSL and aid in decryption. Vandeven (2013) successfully shows how 
Wireshark can be utilised to test encryption methods and traffic flows via a network. 
Secure data flow and encryption methods are necessities for compliance.  
These tools have been chosen as they are recommended to assist in testing each aspect of 
PCI DSS (Koster, 2012; Chuvakin & Williams, 2011), while there are alternatives which are 
more user friendly, they do not provide they comprehensive level of testing offered by the 
tools selected (Koster, 2012; Chuvakin & Williams, 2011). They will assist in evaluating the 
strength of the standard from attacks both inside and outside the network. To assess the 
effectiveness of PCI DSS 3.0 these tools will be used to perform high level penetration tests 
on the network, server and traffic from the web application. As the goal of a malicious user 
is to gain access to sensitive data, the aim of the testing method is to do the same. If the 
data is breached PCI DSS 3.0 will be assessed by comparing the complexity of the breach 
with the information that has been obtained.  
3.7 Summary 
The network topology, tools and testing strategy presented here represent a comprehensive 
plan to gather data on the efficacy of a PCI compliant network.   While standard guidelines 
have been used a series of progressive tools and techniques have been leveraged together 
to augment the current PCI compliance strategies available. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The project implementation explains the necessary steps taken to build a PCI DSS 3.0 
compliant network for testing. The first step is the network build, the layout of the network 
as highlighted in the planning section, showing the segregation of the network. This 
segregation will be implemented in network development and as a result fulfilling 
requirements 1.3.1-1.3.3 and 1.3.7 
4.2 Virtual Network 
The first step in configuring the network is setting up the network switches. To implement 
the high level of segregation the switches for the LAN, DMZ and CDE are implemented 
within vSphere. The switches are configured as separate networks and all communications 
will be restricted via router and firewall configurations. Unlike physical switches rather than 
configuring VLAN IDs and IP subnetting via serial port the virtual network requires the IP 
ranges and subnets to be configured upon set-up and then the VMs can be added to the 
appropriate VLANs. The CDE has a stricter set of subnetting rules to restrict the number of 
devices enabled on a switch and avoiding open ports as shown in Figure 4. VSphere allows 
for simple scalability as if more active ports are required it does not require a full-network 
configuration but rather only an adjustment of the properties tab meaning a higher of level 
of security as negating the need for unnecessary open ports.  
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Figure 4: Network Switches 
 
4.3 CDA and DMZ Initial Configuration 
Ubuntu Server is being implemented as the CDE and DMZ servers. Two new virtual 
machines are created and the Ubuntu Server image is chosen as the OS. The country, 
language and keyboard layout are chosen appropriately once prompted. At this point the 
server is configured to comply with the first CIS audit (Center of Internet Security, 2015) 
requirements, while this is requirement is part of PCI DSS requirement 2, this aspect of the 
CIS audit is easier to configure during the installation process due to disk partitioning. The 
partitions are set up as can be seen in Figure 5. This implements segregates application and 
OS information, however in production these disk spaces would be much larger due to 
building many VMs for the testing environment resources are applied sparingly.  
 
Figure 5: Ubuntu Hard Disk Partitions 
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The remaining CIS audit techniques will be configured post-server installation due to access 
limitations post-audit. This initial configuration is utilised for both the web server and 
database server on the network. 
4.4 Database Server 
For the database server in the CDE PhpMyAdmin and MySql-Server are installed. On 
installation PhpMyAdmin and MySql require passwords to be set. This is competed on the 
prompt screen. The next step is to log into PhpMyAdmin with the default root username 
and password. For PCI DSS default log in credentials must be removed, PhpMyAdmin has 
three default user accounts. To remove the default login settings new users will first have to 
be created. This is completed by selecting new user and adding a new username and 
password. For the database server two users are assigned as shown in Figure 6, one for 
administration and one for maintenance.  
 
Figure 6: Removal of Default PhpMyAdmin Users 
The administration user is granted administrative privileges in the database. The second 
user maintenance will be utilised for removing non-required data after 6 months, this user is 
granted no write privileges only delete, to ensure that this is done only as required the 
resource limits are set accordingly .The resource settings limits the frequency one user can 
connect and how many queries they can enter in a period of time. The phpMyAdmin 
configuration files can be viewed in Appendix B. To implement the SQL tables to interact 
with OpenCart a new database is created within phpMyAdmin. The SQL provided with 
OpenCart is loaded into the database to create the fields required. Upon completion of the 
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database set up the remaining CIS Ubuntu audit (Center of Internet Security, 2015)is 
completed to secure the OS, Figure 7 shows all of the areas secured by this audit. 
Implementing the CIS audit on Ubuntu virtual Machines fulfils requirement 2.2 of PCI DSS 
3.0 and provides a higher level of OS security as the audit techniques harden the systems OS 
to industry standard.  
Task Status 
Patching and Software Updates Completed 
File System Configuration Completed 
Secure Boot Settings Completed 
Additional Process Hardening Completed 
OS Services Completed 
Special Purpose Services Completed 
Network Configuration and Firewalls Completed 
Logging and Auditing Completed 
System Access and Authorisation Completed 
User Accounts and Environments Completed 
Warning Banners Completed 
Verify System File Permissions Completed 
Review User Group and Settings Completed 
 
Figure 7: Audit Ubuntu Server Checklist (Center of Internet Security, 2015) 
 The CIS audit as outlined in PCI DSS requirement 2.2 on the servers also implements many 
other of the standards requirements. Logging, file integrity management, user groups and 
password requirements are all configured on the server via the audits guidelines and full 
configuration files can be viewed in Appendix C. While these guidelines do enforce logging, 
IDS and file integrity, this is only implemented on a host level, further security measures will 
be implemented on a network level in the firewall configurations. 
4.5 Web Server Configuration 
After the Initial OS installation as explained previously, apache2 is installed on the server by 
entering sudo apt-get install apache2. The functionality of the server is then tested by 
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entering localhost into the browser window and the below page appears confirming the 
successful installation of Apache2 
 
Figure 8: Apache Server Confirmation 
PhpMyAdmin is also installed on this server to allow communication to the CDE server by 
entering sudo apt-get install phpmyadmin. After successful installation the php 
configuration settings need to be updated. The ‘phpmyadmin/conf.inc.php’ file is edited to 
connect to the database server located at 192.168.40.10 rather than the default of 12.0.0.7.  
This means that all sensitive information will be located in the CDE rather than on a MySQL 
server within the DMZ. PhpMyAdmin default users are removed using the same process as 
used with the database server.  
The server is also hardened to comply with the CIS Apache audit (Center of Internet 
Security, 2012), areas of security that are added to the server are represented in Figure 9. 
The apache2 affected configuration files are located in Appendix D. 
Task Notes Status 
Planning Checklist Will be completed with IDS and Firewall  Pending 
Minimize Apache Modules  Completed 
Permission and Ownership Configuration  Completed 
Access Control Configuration  Completed 
Minimize Features and Options  Completed 
Logging Monitoring and Maintenance  Completed 
Use SSL/TLS  Completed 
Information Leakage  Completed 
DDOS Mitigation  Completed 
Request Limits  Completed 
 
Figure 9: CIS Audit Apache Server Checklist (Centre of Internet Security, 2012) 
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4.6 ClearOS Setup 
To allow communications between the Virtual Network and the ISP router ClearOS is 
installed as the external facing network router. Clear OS is configured with three NICs one 
with a NAT address to allow communications to the physical ISP router and the other two 
are the host only NICs, one for the LAN and the other the CDE. To allow for ClearOS to 
successfully communicate between the internal and external network a static IP from the 
ISP is required and assigned to eth0.  The new virtual machine is created with the three NICs 
and ClearOS is selected as the disk image. Once the virtual disk is configured with the OS the 
router and firewall can be modified. The initial step is to ensure ClearOs is set in gateway 
mode so traffic is filtered.  ClearOS automatically assigned the NICs correctly with eth0 
external and eth1 and eth2 internal as shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10: ClearOS Interfaces 
To further protect the network both firewall and IDS configurations are applied on ClearOS 
via the marketplace GUI.  The ClearOS firewall utilises iptables for firewall protection and 
Snort for IDS. These are implemented via the ClearOS guidelines for firewall (ClearCentre, 
2014a) and IDS (ClearCentre, 2015b) integration. 
The last thing required for the firewall is to configure logging. The ClearOS firewall comes 
with logging viewer installed; to implement the feature log viewer is activated. This keeps 
files of all the firewall logs and also provides a filter system for system administrators, for 
easier log management.  Clear OS configuration files are located in Appendix E. 
4.7 Smoothwall Setup 
As the network design also requires firewall routers for communications, two further 
routers are configured on the network. Smoothwall also requires two NICs one facing the 
internal network and one facing the DMZ. This regulates the flow of traffic so everything 
from the internal LAN flows through the Smoothwall routers and is forwarded to Clear OS 
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router. As there is no external facing NICs Smoothwall unlike the Smoothwall configuration 
they are not automatically assigned so are chosen manually again with eth0 as external 
facing the DMZ and eth1 internal facing the LAN on the first router and on the second 
Smoothwall router eth1 faces the CDE.  As Smoothwall is a Linux distribution it also utilises 
iptables, the full configuration can be seen in Appendix F.  
 
Figure 11: Smoothwall Configuration and Logging Options 
4.8 Security Protocols 
To allow for secure communications from the servers OpenSSL is installed by entering sudo 
apt-get install openssl. Due to the known weaknesses with SSL, the PCI Security 
Standards Council are releasing an updated version of PCI DSS v3 to remove SSL as a 
compliant protocol. So these changes won’t affect the network it is configured with TLS. This 
step is completed by entering the command sudo nano /etc/ssl.conf and locating the 
line that says Protocols All. This line is changed to: Protocols +TLSv1.2, +TLSv.1. In the 
ssl.conf file the cipher suite values are also ensured that no weak encryption ciphers are 
utilised. For the apache server to communicate using this method encrypted keys need to 
be created and imported into the apache2 SSL folder, the keys are created as shown in 
Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: Implementation of RSA SSL 
To ensure that the TLS protocol has been successfully applied to the localhost a connection 
to the localhost is tested with the command openssl s_client – connect localhost: 
443. The output as shown in Figure 13 shows the successful configuration of TLS on the 
server. 
 
Figure 13: TLS v1.2 configuration 
While this will secure all communications via https to the localhost, communications 
between the web server and database in the CDE also need to be secure. To complete this, 
a SSL certificate is created on the CDE database in the same manner as completed with the 
apache server. When the key is created the SQL configuration file my.conf is altered to 
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utilise this cert for secure communications. To ensure MySQL SSL configurations are 
successful the SSL variables are verified as shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Successful MySQL SSL configuration 
4.9 Wireless Security 
The ISP router providing connectivity is set to use WPA2 secured connections as default. The 
encryption method used was AES which. The username and passwords are changed from 
the default setting as required by entering the routers IP address into the address bar of a 
connected device. The password set is a 16 character alpha-numeric password that contains 
no dictionary words to increase the level of security on the router 
4.10 Database Encryption 
OpenCart enables the sensitive data (payment and password information) being passed 
through the website to be salted and hashed, so sensitive data entering the database is 
already encrypted, however this was an issue in each website scanned, the hashing 
algorithms utilised in the code base are MD5. As PCI DSS 3.0 requires using strong 
cryptographic algorithms in the PHP files responsible for applying the hash values the 
algorithm used is changed to SHA256 for stronger encryption. The SALT is created with the 
open-ssl random number generator. While using SALT on the password does have 
performance implications is does add a much higher level of security as brute forcing of 
password attacks on passwords become much more complex due to the randomly 
generated values appended to the passwords, therefore the level of security outweighs the 
performance issues that will be encountered.  
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4.11 Secure Programming 
While the report from the static code scan showed many lines of secure coding weaknesses, 
many of the results were for the same issues: shell commands, cross site scripting from non-
sanitised input and the utilisation of MD5 and pseudo-random number generators. Before 
the website is connected to the server these vulnerabilities are mitigated for. The MD5 
hashing algorithms are changed to use the stronger sha256 hashing algorithm and the 
00random number generator mt_rand() is replaced with the more secure open-ssl random 
number generator as the generated values are less predictable. 
The code base is secured further by editing the php.ni file on the Apache server to disallow 
shell commands to be executed.  
 
Figure 15: php.ini configuration 
The remaining vulnerability is mitigated for by changing register_globals from the default 
ON to OFF. For an extra level of security the Toolkit package is downloaded. This is an open 
source library to help in the securing of php and it includes libraries for escape 
management. This is successfully added by downloading the toolkit and linking to the php 
code base. 
4.12 Anti-Virus 
To fulfil the PCI DSS 3.0 requirement Comodo anti-virus software for Linux systems is 
installed on the network devices. As Comodo is designed to be used on Linux OS it can be 
applied to both servers and desktops. Unlike other anti-virus software available for Linux 
platforms Comodo has the ability to quarantine affected files to a folder on the system for 
analysis, meaning that the affected files will not have access to system files, further securing 
network devices. 
40 
 
 
Figure 16: Comodo Installation 
 
4.13 Self-Assessment 
While this methodology successfully implements the full PCI DSS 3.0 standard there are also 
many self-assessment options available as shown in Figure 17. Many of these do not require 
the full implementation of all twelve PCI DSS 3.0 requirements. The testing section will not 
only test the network for weaknesses but along with this any found weaknesses will be 
compared to the to the self-assessment options to verify the strength of these alternative 
compliance options.  
 
Figure 17: Self-Assessment Versions 
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5 Testing 
The testing methodologies that are explained below are based on the NIST SP 800-15 (Cody, 
et al., 2008) standard. Initially focusing on network communications then wireless access 
points, vulnerability scanning and finally penetration testing.  The order completed testing 
the network from the outside inwards, as to initially harden the network from malicious 
outside traffic.  
5.1 Secure Network Communications 
To ensure communications via the web server are secure Wireshark is utilised on the 
webserver. To start the capture the loopback connection for the localhost server is selected 
as the target connection, once this is selected localhost is entered into a browser window 
and the capture is started. On the website an item is added to the shopping cart and the 
payment process is started. 
Upon completion the Wireshark capture is stopped and the capture file of the transaction is 
opened. Figure 23 shows the successful implementation of TLS for secure encrypted 
communications. The TLS handshake is initiated before any transactions between the web 
server and client are undertaken. 
 
Figure 18: Wireshark TLS handshake 
While this shows the initial TLS handshake to ensure all communications are secured the 
protocols for the entire transaction are captured.  As highlighted in Figure 24 all packets to 
and from the server were completed using https for secure communications. All data sent to 
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and from the server is using this secure communication technique, mitigating for sensitive 
data being sniffed in clear text from the network communications.  
 
Figure 19: HTTPS Communications 
5.2 Vulnerability Scanning 
Nikto is utilised to assess vulnerabilities on the web server. To initiate the vulnerability scan 
the Nikto configuration file first needs to be edited to enable scans of localhost proxies. This 
is completed by removing the comments from the proxy configuration in the Nikto 
config.text file as show in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 20: Nikto Configuration 
Once the changes above have been completed the scan is completed by inserting the 
command nikto –h localhost. 
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5.2.1 Findings 
Weaknesses were discovered in the web server utilising Nikto, please refer to Appendix H 
for the outputted Nikto scan results. Seven vulnerabilities were returned by the scanner, all 
of which are cross site scripting weaknesses 
1. phpimageview.php located in PHP Image View 1.0 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting  
2. links.php in myphpnuke is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting 
3. modules.php in Post Nuke 0.7.2.3-Phoenix is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting 
4.  members.asp in Web Wiz Forums 7.01 and below is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting 
5. forum_members.asp in Web Wiz Forums 7.01 and below is vulnerable to Cross Site 
Scripting 
5.3 Wireless Testing 
Kali is utilised to test the wireless security on the network. Kali comes with Aircrack already 
installed and this piece of software will be utilised in an attempt to hack into the wireless 
network.  
5.3.1 Aircrack 
To utilise in Aircrack in Kali a wireless network adapter must be installed on the virtual 
machine. To initiate the testing iwconfig is entered to ensure the virtual machine 
successfully recognised the wireless network adapter, furthermore to ensure wlan0 is active 
the command airmon-ng start wlan0 is entered. This command also creates a mon0 
testing interface. The next step is to scan for wireless interfaces. This is completed with the 
command airodump-ng mon0. This returns a screen as shown in Figure 18 that shows the 
name of the wireless router, the encryption protocols utilised and the channel.  
 
Figure 21: Scan for Wireless Routers 
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Aircrack injects packets to force a client to reconnect to the wireless router. To be able to 
capture this process a Wireshark file of the process is required to be captured. To complete 
this airodump-ng –bssid 90:EF:68:3E:7F:4E –channel 3 write wificapture mon0. 
This creates a Wireshark file to store the data of the packet injection. To insert the packets 
aireplay-ng -0 3 –a 90:EF:68:3E:7F:4E –c FC:0F:E6:D9:3A:DD mon0 is entered 
into the terminal. Figure 19 shows the successful injection of the de-authorisation packets 
between the two devices.  
 
Figure 22: De-Authorisation Packet Injection 
The wireshark file is filtered by the EAPOL protocol to ensure the packet injection was 
successful. This files show the re-authentication of the client to the wireless router. The 
packet injection was successful and the communications are encrypted via AES. 
 
Figure 23: Wireshark capture of AES keys 
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To attempt to crack the password on the router a password cracker is run through aircrack, 
this compares encrypted values to the AES encryption values. To complete this darkc0de.lst 
is downloaded, it contains a comprehensive password list to compare to the Wireshark 
encryption values. To run the password cracking the command aircrack-ng  wificapture 
–w /usr/share/wordlists/darkc0de.lst. 
5.3.2 Findings 
As illustrated in Figure 21 the WPA2 cracking attempt was unsuccessful, both dictionary and 
alpha-numeric values were entered as password values. As the wireless access key is 
comprised of a 14 characters, is alpha-numeric with no dictionary values the complexity of 
the password was not able to be cracked showing utilising this method.  
 
Figure 24: Failed Aircrack Attack 
5.4 Penetration Testing 
Armitage and Metasploit are used together from the Kali virtual machine to penetration test 
all network devices. Armitage and Metasploit are used in the same manner on all devices on 
the network. To initiate the penetration testing Metasploit and PostgreSQL are started on 
the virtual machine and when both applications have successfully loaded armitage is 
entered into the terminal. To determine the operating system being utilised on the target 
machine it is selected in the Armitage window and an Nmap OS scan is completed. 
Nmap successfully detects the operating system of the client and Metasploit uses this data 
to customise the exploits to the host OS. To see the available exploits show payloads is 
entered into the terminal, this shows all available payloads on the target system. To verify if 
the host machine is vulnerable the check command can be utilised to verify this. While the 
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process of finding exploits on each target machine is the machine, the results vary based on 
the OS. The full Metasploit scan findings can be viewed in Appendix G. 
5.4.1 Ubuntu Servers Findings  
While the servers were secured to comply with both CIS audits and PCI DSS 3.0 before 
testing, there were still vulnerabilities found on both machines. Both servers returned the 
same vulnerabilities with no result differences.   
Cuteflow File Upload Exploit 
This exploit was found on both Ubuntu servers as is a component that is automatically 
installed upon mounting operating system. This exploit required no credentials and allows 
the attacker to upload php files into the system and run them as executables, this is very 
dangerous as will allow these files to gain access to all information installed on host 
machine.  
Skybluecanvas Exec Exploit 
This vulnerability also does not require any login credentials for execution it allows attackers 
to execute shell commands via php editing database credentials when the PID value is equal 
to 4. The php.ini file on both servers has been configured to disallow shell commands aiding 
to mitigate for this type of attack, however to further secure systems the functionality 
should be assessed and removed if not required. 
5.4.2 ClearOS Findings 
Tectia Password Change Request Exploit 
This vulnerability is found in UNIX systems that utilise Tectia Server for SSH functionality. 
The exploit allows an attacker to brute force the username, once this has been found a 
password reset request is sent and accepted by the server. This allows the attacker to 
change login credentials to ones of their own choosing and therefore after gaining access 
change the firewall rules to maintain network access. 
5.4.3 Smoothwall Findings 
Gitorious Graph Exploit 
Metasploit successfully found and exploited the gitorious graph vulnerability on the 
Smoothwall firewall. This vulnerability exists in the gitorious component pre-installed on the 
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Smoothwall ISO. This allows for an attacker to enter un-validated input to start a command 
line session and gain control of the system. 
5.5 Results Conclusion 
While the network was configured with security in mind, the testing phase still successfully 
uncovered vulnerabilities in the network.  In both the CDE and DMZ servers the functionality 
of cuteflow and skybluecanvas are not required so the files are purged from the systems. 
The same is the case for the SmoothWall firewall and vulnerable files are purged. For 
ClearOS as the user name was brute forced and no password was required, to mitigate for 
this the username is updated to comply with password best practices, utilising numbers 
letters and special characters. 
While this form of testing is required on full implementation of the standard this not the 
case for all SAQ options. Furthermore, the issue with lack of guidance on testing frameworks 
provided may result in a network that is only as strong as the research carried out by the 
tester on other suitable frameworks. To highlight this particular issue with the standard, 
requirement 11.3 of PCI DSS 3.0 requires penetration testing be completed on the network. 
Figure 25 shows that framework NIST SP800-115 may be used however no others are listed 
for comparison.  
 
Figure 25: PCI DSS Requirement 11.3 
For example on the network built in the methodology section if only CDE connections were 
tested vulnerabilities in firewalls and servers would remain. The vulnerabilities that would 
have remained would allow bypassing of external firewall due to password exploitations and 
the server would vulnerable to malicious php that could then be executed on the server.   
Not only do many of the self-assessments fail to uncover the issues as outlined above there 
is a vast difference between the security levels enforced when comparing the full standard 
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and the SAQs. While network and code weaknesses in this implementation would have 
successfully uncovered these weaknesses pre-production only fulfilling SAQ requirements 
may lead to weak coding and networking practices.  
5.5.1 SAQ A v3.0 
This self-assessment version while only requires requirement 9 and 12 to be fulfilled the 
prerequisite for this self-assessment is that all payment information is fully outsourced to a 
third party, requirement 12 does require that a contract is in place so the third party 
vendors accept responsibility for ensuring their products are secured to the full standard, 
therefore the merchant is not responsible for any weaknesses that would have been 
uncovered in both the methodology and testing procedures.  
5.5.2 SAQ A-EP v3.0 
SAQ-EP v3 while covers all twelve of the PCI DSS requirements to be fulfilled, not every 
aspect of each requirement are necessary. The documentation of user privileges, access and 
information security are not required as per the full standard, meaning in the event of a 
breach inside from inside the network assisting documentation to assist in finding the 
source is severely limited.   
5.5.3 SAQ for Payment Terminals 
SAQ B v3.0, SAQ B-IP v3.0 and AQ P2PE-HW v3.0 self-assessment options are available for 
card payment machines and are not an option for e-commerce payment applications, 
however with these options for payment card machines there is a lack of required 
documentation for physical access to devices. With physical tampering of devices being a 
high risk, a secure network build and documentation of access should have a higher 
implementation requirement than covered by these self-assessment versions. 
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6 Conclusion 
At its core, PCI DSS v3.0 represents best practice guidelines which, if followed, mitigate the 
risk from many cyber threats.  Its implementation and methodological approach to 
hardening the security profile of an organisation offer considerable benefits.  Indeed, 
recognizing the protection of privacy and civil liberties has come to engender the central 
issue regarding trust between the general public and organisations.   However, ‘one-size-
fits-all’ will not work given the diversity of company objectives and practices.  Added to this, 
the security professional is faced with considerable challenges from given the sophisticated 
nature of new threats (Trustwave, 2013; Verizon, 2013; PWC, 2014; Ponemon, 2014).  
Despite the wealth of experience and lessons learned by security professionals, more work 
is needed.  Existing defences can be improved by developing the most appropriate security 
posture for an organisation which may be aimed at preventing common types of attack 
from damaging the business assets.   Recently, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) published the “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity,” (NIST, 2014) and represents a valuable tool to help organizations assess and 
improve their security systems.  In conjunction with this, security training and certification 
are required and may be implemented relatively quickly so that any gaps in knowledge may 
be filled.  Benefits to organizations include, but are not limited to, increased customer 
confidence, standardized sharing and storage of sensitive information and the simplification 
of practices and operations across international regimes.  The work presented offers a 
progressive and reasonable addition to security education, since there is a dearth of 
research into the advantages of PCI DSS 3.0 implementation the table provided in Appendix 
I provides an in-depth review on how each implementation step fulfilled each requirement. 
On this basis, several areas which are worthy of consideration for those intent on 
implementing PCI DSS v3.0 from a compliance perspective, the perceptions of industry, the 
importance of third party tools, how delays in adoption and subsequent adaptation are 
costly, the importance of self-assessment, some inherent ambiguities in the standard that 
could be changed and the current restrictions of the standard. 
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6.1 Slow to Adapt 
The emergence of Heartbleed and POODLE PCI DSS has prompted the revision of the 
standard.  However Heartbleed was discovered in April 2014 after which POODLE came to 
light in October 2014, the PCI Security Standards Council stated in February 2015 that a 
revised standard will be released ending the acceptance of SSL as secure. This comes ten 
months after the initial vulnerability has come to light. In comparison Chokhani et Al (2014) 
released the NIST guide to TLS in April 2014. This document states that SSL is not an 
approved means of encryption and updated this standard to TLS. This shows a vast gap in 
both re-action times and standard strength. NIST tested and adapted within a month, 
however PCI DSS have only just formally released version 3.1 a full year later and are also 
giving merchants another year to update their systems. While PCI DSS 3.0 has officially been 
retired, the updated requirements of 3.1 will not be fully enforced until June 2016 (PCI 
Security Standards Council, 2015). 
6.2 PCI DSS 3.0 Ambiguities 
While PCI DSS 3.0 does provide a more secure implementation and testing guideline than its 
predecessor there is still vagueness in certain aspects of the standard. PCI DSS 3.0 does 
require that many aspects like penetration testing, implementing cryptographic algorithms 
be completed to industry best practice, there is very little information given on the industry 
best practice guidelines to be followed. It is understood why this is left vague as if a new 
vulnerability is found, an outlined practice may be outdated quickly, but rather than leaving 
room for interpretation these aspects should be more specific. Stating that penetrations 
should be completed to an industry framework such as NIST or another industry framework 
leaves ambiguity to which testing standard can be utilised. Providing a guideline such as 
systems should be tested utilising the most recent NIST framework, means the framework 
will stay up to date and there is no ambiguity as to which industry framework should be 
utilised.   
The same issue exists in the cryptographic section, it is required that strong hashing 
algorithms be utilised with no explanation of a strong hashing algorithm. It is well known 
that MD5 is broken and should not be used, so updating the standard to be more specific 
and require that SHA256 and above be utilised for hashing data leaves much less room for 
interpretation and therefore implementation errors. This was highlighted during the static 
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code scan of all code bases, each code base while being advertised as PCI DSS 3.0 compliant 
utilised MD5 hashing algorithms. 
6.3 Self-Assessment 
It is clear that enforcing security is an expensive task and the self-assessment procedures 
have been enforce to aid smaller business enforce security without the expense of a full 
audit. If a business chooses to handle consumers sensitive information, having that business 
itself assess the security measures in place is not good enough. While the self-assessment 
document is utilised for when card holder is not stored, if the data is being taken from the 
consumer communicated across the network, surely the network communications and 
security levels would be tested to the same extent as when the data is being stored. Data 
breaches are not just confined to storage breaches, but man in the middle breaches are just 
as severe and all communications with sensitive data should be protected and evaluated to 
the same extent.  As Figure 17 showed previously there are many security requirements 
that would not be implemented with the self-assessment options. Requirement 11 helped 
secure the network further, using common attack tools a variety of weaknesses were 
uncovered which would remain in self-assessment versions resulting in a vulnerable 
infrastructure.  
6.4 Failure to comply 
The largest issue with PCI DSS 3.0 is not with the standard itself rather than a lack of 
compliance, or understanding of the standard. While the standard cannot 100% guarantee 
that a breach will not happen, no security standard or compliance document can, Verizon 
(2015) does show there is a large gap in compliance, with all post-breach companies 
assessed by Verizon in 2014 being found to be non-compliant and only 33% of QSA found to 
pass the testing requirement. 
When a company makes the decision to accept and store cardholder information PCI DSS 
should be a pre-requisite not a choice. While there are fines for breaches and non-
compliance this does not seem to be enough to encourage companies to enforce security 
measures. With sensitive and private data at risk the standard needs to be enforced from 
the start. 
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6.5 PCI DSS 3.1 
PCI DSS is constantly evolving with many iterations of a standard being issued throughout its 
lifetime. Close to the completion of this dissertation PCI DSS 3.1 was released implementing 
new guidelines and clarifications on PCI DSS 3.0. However this dissertation focused on 
ground up approach to security, therefore remaining valid for PCI DSS 3.1. As can be seen in 
the guidelines submitted by the PCI Security Standards Council (2015) the revised version 
mainly focus on standard clarifications, the only requirements change is the removal of SSL 
as a secure communications method.   
6.5 Restrictions 
While further tests with alternative hardware and software configurations would have 
yielded data for comparison, this was restricted by financial and time issues.  However, 
given that the tests were performed on a relatively common setup further work could be 
carried out using industry grade platforms and tools. 
6.6 Further Work 
There is much further work that can be initiated to further the work of this dissertation. This 
dissertation focused assessing the standard in a testing environment. To assess the standard 
even further the next step would be to move the network to a physical environment and 
assess any differences in the findings that may come to light. Furthermore the full network 
and site can be further assessed in a live production environment. 
To further evaluate any ambiguities and testing issues in regard to requirement 11, further 
testing is required on the network with varying testing frameworks to evaluate their 
strengths and weaknesses. This will aid in discovering the varying levels of security that the 
different frameworks provide. 
With the new PCI DSS 3.1 being released in April, assessing the changes, how they further 
the security that PCI compliance enforces. The major change being enforced in this standard 
is how data in transit is secured. Since Heartbleed and POODLE have been discovered as 
large weaknesses in SSL communications, PCI DSS have updated the standard to try and 
mitigate this by enforcing the move from SSL to TLS. Further work would be to enforce this 
change on a network utilising SSL and fully assess the TLS standard itself.  As well as 
assessing any further changes that may be enforced in the revised standard.   
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Appendix A - VCG Source Code Scan Results 
Open Cart Scan Results 
 
Result Findings 
Severity Title Description File Name 
Medium Application Variable Used 
on System Command Line 
The application appears to allow the use of an 
unvalidated variable when executing a command.  
ebay_settings.php 
Medium Application Variable Used 
on System Command Line 
The application appears to allow the use of an 
unvalidated variable when executing a command.  
ebay_settings.php 
Medium Application Variable Used 
on System Command Line 
The application appears to allow the use of an 
unvalidated variable when executing a command.  
ebay_settings.php 
Medium Application Variable Used 
on System Command Line 
The application appears to allow the use of an 
unvalidated variable when executing a command.  
openbay.php 
Medium md5 MD5 Hashing algorithm. cba.php 
Medium md5 MD5 Hashing algorithm. cba.php 
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Medium md5 MD5 Hashing algorithm. cba.php 
Medium md5 MD5 Hashing algorithm. confirm.php 
Medium md5 MD5 Hashing algorithm. document.php 
Medium md5 MD5 Hashing algorithm. paymate.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
amazon_checkout.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
amazon_login_pay.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
confirm.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
download.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
paymate.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
pp_express.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
pp_express.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
pp_pro_iframe.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
pp_pro_iframe.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
sagepay_direct.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
sagepay_server.php 
Medium mt_rand The application uses pseudo-random number 
generation that is not cryptographically secure. 
worldpay.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation.  
amazon.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
amazonus.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
amazonus_product.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
amazonus_product.php 
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Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
amazonus_product.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
amazon_product.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
amazon_product.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
amazon_product.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
bluepay_hosted.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
bluepay_hosted.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
bluepay_hosted.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
bluepay_redirect.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
bluepay_redirect.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
bluepay_redirect.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
cba.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
cba.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
cba.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
realex.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
realex.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
realex.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
realex_remote.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
realex_remote.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
realex_remote.php 
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Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
response.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
sagepay_direct.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
sagepay_direct.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
sagepay_direct.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
sagepay_server.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
sagepay_server.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
sagepay_server.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
securetrading_pp.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
securetrading_pp.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
securetrading_pp.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
securetrading_ws.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
securetrading_ws.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
securetrading_ws.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
securetrading_ws.php 
Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen 
with no apparent validation or sanitisation. 
worldpay.php 
Standard exec This function allows execution of commands. It is 
dangerous when used with user controlled 
parameters and may facilitate direct attacks against 
the web server.  
cli_install.php 
Standard preg_replace This function will evaluate PHP code. It is dangerous 
when used with user controlled parameters and may 
facilitate direct attacks against the web server.  
action.php 
Standard preg_replace This function will evaluate PHP code. It is dangerous 
when used with user controlled parameters and may 
address.php 
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facilitate direct attacks against the web server.  
Standard preg_replace This function will evaluate PHP code. It is dangerous 
when used with user controlled parameters and may 
facilitate direct attacks against the web server.  
download.php 
Standard system This function allows execution of commands. It is 
dangerous with user controlled parameters and may 
facilitate direct attacks against the web server. 
ebay_settings.php 
Standard system This function allows execution of commands. It is 
dangerous with user controlled parameters and may 
facilitate direct attacks against the web server. 
openbay.php 
Standard Use of Deterministic 
Pseudo-Random Values 
The resulting values are predictable and may be 
enumerated by a skilled and determined attacker, 
although this is partly mitigated by a seed that does 
not appear to be time-based. 
confirm.php 
Standard Use of Deterministic 
Pseudo-Random Values 
The resulting values are predictable and may be 
enumerated by a skilled and determined attacker, 
although this is partly mitigated by a seed that does 
not appear to be time-based. 
download.php 
Standard Use of Deterministic 
Pseudo-Random Values 
The resulting values are predictable and may be 
enumerated by a skilled and determined attacker, 
although this is partly mitigated by a seed that does 
not appear to be time-based. 
paymate.php 
Low Variable Used as 
FileName 
The application appears to use a variable name in 
order to define a filename used by the application. It 
is unclear whether this variable can be controlled by 
the user  
action.php 
Low Variable Used as 
FileName 
The application appears to use a variable name in 
order to define a filename used by the application. It 
is unclear whether this variable can be controlled by 
the user  
amazon_checkout.php 
Low Variable Used as 
FileName 
The application appears to use a variable name in 
order to define a filename used by the application. It 
is unclear whether this variable can be controlled by 
the user  
backup.php 
 
  
64 
 
Commercial Site1 Scan Results 
 
 
Summary of results 
Priority Severity Title Description 
3 Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen with no apparent 
validation 
3 Medium MD5 MD5 hashing algorithm utilised 
3 Medium Unsafe Password Management The application appears to handle passwords in a case in-sensitive 
manner 
3 Medium Application Variable Used on 
System Command Line 
The application appears to allow the use of variable within backticks 
4 Standard System This function allows execution of commands 
4 Standard Preg_replace This function will evaluate PHP code. It is dangerous when used with 
user controlled input 
4 Standard Create_funtion This function allows execution of commands 
5 Low Variable Used as Filename The application appears to use a variable name in order to define a 
filename 
6 Suspicious Comment indicates potentially 
unfinished code 
The comment includes some wording which indicates that the 
developer regards as unfinished 
 
 
65 
 
Commercial Site2 Scan Results 
 
 
Summary of results 
Priority Severity Title Description 
3 Medium Potential XSS The application appears to reflect data to the screen with no apparent 
validation 
3 Medium MD5 MD5 hashing algorithm utilised 
3 Medium Application Variable Used on 
System Command Line 
The application appears to allow the use of variable within backticks 
3 Medium Mt_rand The function uses pseudo-random number generation that is not 
cryptographically secure 
4 Standard System This function allows execution of commands 
4 Standard Assert This function will evaluate PHP code. It is dangerous when used with 
user controlled input 
4 Standard Preg_replace This function will evaluate PHP code. It is dangerous when used with 
user controlled input 
4 Standard Create_funtion This function allows execution of commands 
4 Standard Exec This function allows execution of commands 
5 Low Variable Used as Filename The application appears to use a variable name in order to 
define a filename 
6 Suspicious Comment indicates potentially 
unfinished code 
The comment includes some wording which indicates that the 
developer regards as unfinished 
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Appendix B - PhpmyAdmin configuration files 
<?php 
/** 
 * Debian local configuration file 
 * This file overrides the settings made by phpMyAdmin interactive setup 
 * utility. 
 * For example configuration see 
 * /usr/share/doc/phpmyadmin/examples/config.sample.inc.php 
 * or 
 * /usr/share/doc/phpmyadmin/examples/config.manyhosts.inc.php 
 * NOTE: do not add security sensitive data to this file (like passwords) 
 * unless you really know what you're doing. If you do, any user that can 
 * run PHP or CGI on your webserver will be able to read them. If you still 
 * want to do this, make sure to properly secure the access to this file 
 */ 
 
if (!function_exists('check_file_access')) { 
 function check_file_access($path) 
 { 
     if (is_readable($path)) { 
  return true; 
     } else { 
  error_log( 
      'phpmyadmin: Failed to load ' . $path 
      . ' Check group www-data has read access and open_basedir 
restrictions.' 
  ); 
  return false; 
     } 
 } 
} 
 
// Load secret generated on postinst 
if (check_file_access('/var/lib/phpmyadmin/blowfish_secret.inc.php')) { 
    require('/var/lib/phpmyadmin/blowfish_secret.inc.php'); 
} 
 
// Load autoconf local config 
if (check_file_access('/var/lib/phpmyadmin/config.inc.php')) { 
    require('/var/lib/phpmyadmin/config.inc.php'); 
} 
 
/* Server(s) configuration */ 
$i = 0; 
// The $cfg['Servers'] array starts with $cfg['Servers'][1].  Do not use 
$cfg['Servers'][0]. 
// You can disable a server config entry by setting host to ''. 
$i++; 
 
/*Read configuration from dbconfig-common */ 
if (check_file_access('/etc/phpmyadmin/config-db.php')) { 
    require('/etc/phpmyadmin/config-db.php'); 
} 
 
/* Configure according to dbconfig-common if enabled */ 
if (!empty($dbname)) { 
    /* Authentication type */ 
    $cfg['Servers'][$i]['auth_type'] = 'cookie'; 
    /* Server parameters */ 
    if (empty($dbserver)) $dbserver = 'localhost'; 
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    $cfg['Servers'][$i]['host'] = $dbserver; 
 
    if (!empty($dbport) || $dbserver != 'localhost') { 
        $cfg['Servers'][$i]['connect_type'] = 'tcp'; 
        $cfg['Servers'][$i]['port'] = $dbport; 
    } 
    //$cfg['Servers'][$i]['compress'] = false; 
    /* Select mysqli if your server has it */ 
    $cfg['Servers'][$i]['extension'] = 'mysqli'; 
    /* Optional: User for advanced features */ 
    $cfg['Servers'][$i]['controluser'] = $dbuser; 
    $cfg['Servers'][$i]['controlpass'] = $dbpass; 
  
    $i++; 
} 
 
$i++; 
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['connect_type']  = 'tcp'; 
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['extension']     = 'mysql'; 
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['compress']      =  FALSE; 
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['auth_type']     = 'config'; 
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['user']          = 'CDEAdmin'; 
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['password']      = 'Brainmc7'; 
 
/*End of servers configuration */ 
 
/*Directories for saving/loading files from server */ 
$cfg['UploadDir'] = ''; 
$cfg['SaveDir'] = ''; 
 
/* Support additional configurations */ 
foreach (glob('/etc/phpmyadmin/conf.d/*.php') as $filename) 
{ 
    include($filename); 
} 
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Appendix C - Ubuntu CIS Audit Configurations 
Fstab - Partition Rules 
# /etc/fstab: static file system information. 
# 
# Use 'blkid' to print the universally unique identifier for a 
# device; this may be used with UUID= as a more robust way to name devices 
# that works even if disks are added and removed. See fstab(5). 
 
# <file system> <mount point>   <type>  <options>       <dump>  <pass> 
# / was on /dev/sda2 during installation 
UUID=644ac70b-6978-4f48-8d20-78784701b807 /               ext4    
errors=remount-ro 0       1 
 
# /home was on /dev/sda6 during installation 
UUID=686b06d9-df88-459f-8dfc-9d82b5961a78 /home           ext4    
defaults,nodev,noexec,nosuid        0       2 
 
# /tmp was on /dev/sda7 during installation 
UUID=ff8cc2a2-d6c6-4068-bd4c-04ec509adb20 /tmp            ext4    
defaults,nodev,noexec,nosuid        0       2 
 
# /var was on /dev/sda8 during installation 
UUID=55674176-0a77-4003-87ff-061166706425 /var            ext4           
defaults,nodev,noexec,nosuid   0       2 
 
# /var/log was on /dev/sda9 during installation 
UUID=9ef999e4-9723-4e84-9e81-d2436c4242be /var/log        ext4    defaults        
0       2 
 
# /var/log/audit was on /dev/sda10 during installation 
UUID=4fca5fb3-1939-4f69-b08b-d9e25a6bbf6d /var/log/audit  ext4    defaults        
0       2 
 
# swap was on /dev/sda5 during installation 
UUID=8bc7e44f-8c17-449f-9395-8477bdc5301f none            swap    sw              
0       0 
/dev/fd0 /media/floppy0  auto    rw,user,noauto,exec,utf8 0       0 
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Sysctl.conf – Set Routing to Disabled per CIS Guidelines 
# /etc/sysctl.conf - Configuration file for setting system variables 
 
#kernel.domainname = example.com 
 
# Uncomment the following to stop low-level messages on console 
#kernel.printk = 3 4 1 3 
 
##############################################################3 
# Functions previously found in netbase 
# 
 
# Turn on Source Address Verification in all interfaces to 
# prevent some spoofing attacks 
#net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1 
#net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1 
 
# See http://lwn.net/Articles/277146/ 
# Note: This may impact IPv6 TCP sessions too 
#net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 
 
#net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 
 
#  Enabling this option disables Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 
#  based on Router Advertisements for this host 
#net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1 
 
 
################################################################### 
# Additional settings - these settings can improve the network 
# security of the host and prevent against some network attacks 
# including spoofing attacks and man in the middle attacks through 
# redirection. Some network environments, however, require that these 
# settings are disabled so review and enable them as needed. 
# 
# Do not accept ICMP redirects (prevent MITM attacks) 
#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 
#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 
# _or_ 
# Accept ICMP redirects only for gateways listed in our default 
# gateway list (enabled by default) 
# net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 1 
# 
# Do not send ICMP redirects (we are not a router) 
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0 
# 
# Do not accept IP source route packets (we are not a router) 
#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 
#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 
# 
# Log Martian Packets 
#net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1 
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Auditd.conf – Configure System for Logging 
 
# This file controls the configuration of the audit daemon 
# 
 
log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log 
log_format = RAW 
log_group = root 
priority_boost = 4 
flush = INCREMENTAL 
freq = 20 
num_logs = 5 
disp_qos = lossy 
dispatcher = /sbin/audispd 
name_format = NONE 
##name = mydomain 
max_log_file = 6  
max_log_file_action = keep_logs 
space_left = 75 
space_left_action = email 
action_mail_acct = root 
admin_space_left = 50 
admin_space_left_action = HALT 
disk_full_action = SUSPEND 
disk_error_action = SUSPEND 
##tcp_listen_port =  
tcp_listen_queue = 5 
tcp_max_per_addr = 1 
##tcp_client_ports = 1024-65535 
tcp_client_max_idle = 0 
enable_krb5 = no 
krb5_principal = auditd 
##krb5_key_file = /etc/audit/audit.key 
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Audit .rules – Set Rules for Audit Log Files 
# This file contains the auditctl rules that are loaded 
# whenever the audit daemon is started via the initscripts. 
# The rules are simply the parameters that would be passed 
# to auditctl. 
# First rule - delete all 
-D 
# Increase the buffers to survive stress events. 
# Make this bigger for busy systems 
-b 320 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k time-change 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S stime -k time-
change 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -k time-change 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -k time-change 
-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k time-change 
-w /etc/group -p wa -k identity 
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k identity 
-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k identity 
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k identity 
-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k identity 
-a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k system-locale 
-a exit,always -F arch=b32 -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k system-locale 
-w /etc/issue -p wa -k system-locale 
-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k system-locale 
-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k system-locale 
-w /etc/network -p wa -k system-locale 
-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy 
-w /var/log/faillog -p wa -k logins 
-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins 
-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins 
-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session 
-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session 
-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=500 \ 
-F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=500 \ 
-F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F 
auid>=500 \ 
-F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F 
auid>=50$ 
-F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S 
removexattr -S \ lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F 
auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S 
removexattr$ 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S truncate -S 
ftruncate \ 
-F exit=EACCES -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k acccess 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S truncate -S 
ftruncate \ 
-F exit=EACCES -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k acccess 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S truncate -S 
ftruncate \ 
-F exit=EPERM -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k acccess 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S truncate -S 
ftruncate \ 
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-F exit=EPERM -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k acccess 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k 
mounts 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k 
mounts 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F 
auid>=500 \ 
-F auid!=4294967295 -k delete 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F 
auid>$ 
-F auid!=4294967295 -k delete 
-w sudoers -p wa -k scope 
-w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k actions 
-w /sbin/insmod -p x -k modules 
-w /sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules 
-w /sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules 
-e 2 
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Password Implementation 
Login.defs - Logging Incorrect Attempts and Setting Password LifeCycle 
# /etc/login.defs - Configuration control definitions for the login 
package. 
# Three items must be defined:  MAIL_DIR, ENV_SUPATH, and ENV_PATH. 
# Modified for Linux.  --marekm 
 
# REQUIRED for useradd/userdel/usermod 
#   Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the 
#   home directory.  If you _do_ define MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE, 
#   MAIL_DIR takes precedence. 
#   Essentially: 
#     - MAIL_DIR defines the location of users mail spool files 
#       (for mbox use) by appending the username to MAIL_DIR as defined 
#       below. 
#     - MAIL_FILE defines the location of the users mail spool files as the 
#       fully-qualified filename obtained by prepending the user home 
#       directory before $MAIL_FILE 
MAIL_DIR        /var/mail 
 
# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login failure info. 
# This option conflicts with the pam_tally PAM module. 
FAILLOG_ENAB  yes 
 
# Enable display of unknown usernames when login failures are recorded. 
# WARNING: Unknown usernames may become world readable.  
# See #290803 and #298773 for details about how this could become a  
# security concern 
LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB no 
 
# Enable logging of successful logins 
LOG_OK_LOGINS  no 
 
# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg. 
SYSLOG_SU_ENAB  yes 
SYSLOG_SG_ENAB  yes 
 
# If defined, login failures will be logged here in a utmp format 
# last, when invoked as lastb, will read /var/log/btmp, so... 
FTMP_FILE /var/log/btmp 
 
# If defined, the command name to display when running "su -".  For 
# example, if this is defined as "su" then a "ps" will display the 
# command is "-su".  If not defined, then "ps" would display the 
# name of the shell actually being run, e.g. something like "-sh". 
SU_NAME  su 
 
# If defined, file which inhibits all the usual chatter during the login 
# sequence.  If a full pathname, then hushed mode will be enabled if the 
# user's name or shell are found in the file.  If not a full pathname, then 
# hushed mode will be enabled if the file exists in the user's home 
# directory. 
HUSHLOGIN_FILE .hushlogin 
 
# *REQUIRED*  The default PATH settings, for superuser and normal users. 
# (they are minimal, add the rest in the shell startup files) 
ENV_SUPATH
 PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin 
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ENV_PATH PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games 
 
# Login configuration initializations: 
# ERASECHAR Terminal ERASE character ('\010' = backspace). 
# KILLCHAR Terminal KILL character ('\025' = CTRL/U). 
# UMASK  Default "umask" value. 
ERASECHAR 0177 
KILLCHAR 025 
UMASK  077 
 
# Password aging controls: 
# PASS_MAX_DAYS Maximum number of days a password may be used. 
# PASS_MIN_DAYS Minimum number of days allowed between password 
changes. 
# PASS_WARN_AGE Number of days warning given before a password 
expires. 
PASS_MAX_DAYS 60 
PASS_MIN_DAYS 7 
PASS_WARN_AGE 7 
 
# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd 
UID_MIN    1000 
UID_MAX   60000 
 
# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd 
GID_MIN    1000 
GID_MAX   60000 
 
# Max number of login retries if password is bad. This will most likely be 
# overriden by PAM, since the default pam_unix module has it's own built 
# in of 3 retries. However, this is a safe fallback in case you are using 
# an authentication module that does not enforce PAM_MAXTRIES. 
LOGIN_RETRIES  5 
 
# Max time in seconds for login 
LOGIN_TIMEOUT  60 
 
# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn - use 
# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work 
# phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed. 
# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh". 
CHFN_RESTRICT  rwh 
 
# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory? 
# Default in no. 
DEFAULT_HOME yes 
 
# Enable setting of the umask group bits to be the same as owner bits 
# (examples: 022 -> 002, 077 -> 007) for non-root users, if the uid is 
# the same as gid, and username is the same as the primary group name. 
# If set to yes, userdel will remove the userÂ´s group if it contains no 
# more members, and useradd will create by default a group with the name 
# of the user. 
USERGROUPS_ENAB yes 
 
# Note: It is recommended to use a value consistent with 
# the PAM modules configuration. 
# 
ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512 
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Pam.d  - Set Passwords to Required 
 
# /etc/pam.d/common-password - password-related modules common to all  
# services 
# This file is included from other service-specific PAM config files, 
# and should contain a list of modules that define the services to be 
# used to change user passwords.  The default is pam_unix. 
 
 
# As of pam 1.0.1-6, this file is managed by pam-auth-update by default. 
# To take advantage of this, it is recommended that you configure any 
# local modules either before or after the default block, and use 
# pam-auth-update to manage selection of other modules.  See 
# pam-auth-update(8) for details. 
 
# here are the per-package modules (the "Primary" block) 
Password [success=1 default=ignore] pam_unix.so remember=5 obscure sha512 
 
# here's the fallback if no module succeeds 
Password requisite pam_deny.so 
 
# prime the stack with a positive return value if there isn't one already; 
# this avoids us returning an error just because nothing sets a success 
# code since the modules above will each just jump around 
Password required pam_permit.so 
 
# and here are more per-package modules (the "Additional" block) 
Password optional pam_gnome_keyring.so 
 
password required pam_cracklib.so retry=3 minlen=14 dcredit=-1 ucredit=-1 
ocredit=-1 lcredit=-1  
 
password sufficient pam_unix.so remember=5 
 
# end of pam-auth-update config 
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Shadow  Configuration Sets Password Attempts Limits  
 
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `login' service 
# Enforce a minimal delay in case of failure (in microseconds). 
# (Replaces the `FAIL_DELAY' setting from login.defs) 
# Note that other modules may require another minimal delay. (for example, 
# to disable any delay, you should add the nodelay option to pam_unix) 
auth optional pam_faildelay.so delay=3000000 
 
# Outputs an issue file prior to each login prompt 
auth required pam_tally2.so onerr=fail audit silent deny=5 unlock_time=900 
 
# Disallows root logins except on tty's listed in /etc/securetty 
# root will not be prompted for a password on insecure lines. 
# if an invalid username is entered, a password is prompted (but login 
# will eventually be rejected) 
# You can change it to a "requisite" module if you think root may mis-type 
# her login and should not be prompted for a password in that case. But 
# this will leave the system as vulnerable to user enumeration attacks. 
# You can change it to a "required" module if you think it permits to 
# guess valid user names of your system (invalid user names are considered 
# as possibly being root on insecure lines), but root passwords may be 
# communicated over insecure lines. 
auth [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad 
default=die] pam_securetty.so 
 
# Disallows other than root logins when /etc/nologin exists 
# (Replaces the `NOLOGINS_FILE' option from login.defs) 
Auth requisite pam_nologin.so 
 
# SELinux needs to be the first session rule. This ensures that any  
# lingering context has been cleared. Without out this it is possible  
# that a module could execute code in the wrong domain. 
# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient 
session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] 
pam_selinux.so close 
 
# This module parses environment configuration file(s) 
# and also allows you to use an extended config 
# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf. 
# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1" 
Session required pam_env.so readenv=1 
 
# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch 
# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt 
Session required pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale 
 
# Standard Un*x authentication. 
@include common-auth 
 
# This allows certain extra groups to be granted to a user 
# based on things like time of day, tty, service, and user. 
auth optional pam_group.so 
 
# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set 
# time restrainst on logins. 
# account requisite pam_time.so 
 
# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf 
# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login) 
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Session required pam_limits.so 
auth required pam_tally2.so onerr=fail audit silent deny=5 unlock_time=900 
 
# Prints the last login info upon succesful login 
# (Replaces the `LASTLOG_ENAB' option from login.defs) 
session optional pam_lastlog.so 
 
# Prints the message of the day upon succesful login. 
# (Replaces the `MOTD_FILE' option in login.defs) 
# This includes a dynamically generated part from /run/motd.dynamic 
# and a static (admin-editable) part from /etc/motd. 
Session optional pam_motd.so motd=/run/motd.dynamic noupdate 
Session optional pam_motd.so 
 
# Prints the status of the user's mailbox upon succesful login 
# This also defines the MAIL environment variable 
# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables 
# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user  
# also removes the user's mail spool file. 
Session optional pam_mail.so standard 
 
# Standard Un*x account and session 
@include common-account 
@include common-session 
@include common-password 
 
# SELinux needs to intervene at login time to ensure that the process 
# starts in the proper default security context. Only sessions which are 
# intended to run in the user's context should be run after this. 
session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] 
pam_selinux.so open 
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Appendix D - Apache CIS Audit Configuration 
000-default.conf - Local Host Sites Configuration File 
 
<VirtualHost *:80> 
# The ServerName directive sets the request scheme, hostname and port 
# that the server uses to identify itself. 
# This is used when creating redirection URLs. In the context of      
# virtual hosts, the ServerName specifies what hostname must appear  
 # in the request's Host: header to match this virtual host. 
 # For the default virtual host (this file) this value is not 
 # decisive as it is used as a last resort host regardless. 
 # However, you must set it for any further virtual host explicitly. 
 #ServerName www.example.com 
 
 ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost 
 DocumentRoot /var/www/ 
 ServerName localhost 
 Redirect / https://localhost/ 
 
 <Directory /var/www/> 
  Order allow,deny 
  Allow from all 
  AllowOverride None 
  Options None 
  TraceEnable Off 
   <LimitExcept GET POST OPTIONS> 
    deny from all 
   </LimitExcept> 
 
 </Directory> 
 
 # Available loglevels: trace8,trace1, debug, info, notice, warn, 
 # error, crit, alert, emerg. 
 # It is also possible to configure the loglevel for particular 
 # modules, e.g. 
 LogLevel notice  
 
 ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log 
 CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined 
 
 # For most configuration files from conf-available/, which are 
 # enabled or disabled at a global level, it is possible to 
 # include a line for only one particular virtual host.  
 
</VirtualHost> 
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Default-ssl.conf - HTTPS Local Host Configuration File 
<IfModule mod_ssl.c> 
 <VirtualHost _default_:443> 
  ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost 
 
  DocumentRoot /var/www/ 
  LogLevel notice  
  ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log 
  CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined 
 
  #   SSL Engine Switch: 
  #   Enable/Disable SSL for this virtual host. 
  SSLEngine on 
 
  #   SSLCertificateFile directive is needed. 
  SSLCertificateFile /etc/apache2/ssl/apache.pem 
   
  #   Certificate Authority (CA): 
  #   Set the CA certificate verification path where to find CA 
  #   certificates for client authentication or alternatively one 
  #   huge file containing all of them (file must be PEM encoded) 
  #SSLCACertificatePath /etc/ssl/certs/ 
  #SSLCACertificateFile /etc/apache2/ssl.crt/ca-bundle.crt 
 
  #   Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL): 
  #   Set the CA revocation path where to find CA CRLs for client 
  #   authentication or alternatively one huge file containing  
  #   all of them (file must be PEM encoded) 
  #   Note: Inside SSLCARevocationPath you need hash symlinks 
  #   to point to the certificate files. 
  #   SSLCARevocationPath /etc/apache2/ssl.crl/ 
  #   SSLCARevocationFile /etc/apache2/ssl.crl/ca-bundle.crl 
 
  #   Client Authentication (Type): 
  #   Client certificate verification type and depth.  Types are 
  #   none, optional, require and optional_no_ca.  Depth is a 
  #   number which specifies how deeply to verify the certificate 
  #   issuer chain before deciding the certificate is not valid. 
  #SSLVerifyClient require 
  #SSLVerifyDepth  10 
 
  #   SSL Engine Options: 
  #SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth +ExportCertData +StrictRequire 
  <FilesMatch "\.(cgi|shtml|phtml|php)$"> 
    SSLOptions +StdEnvVars 
  </FilesMatch> 
  <Directory /usr/lib/cgi-bin> 
    SSLOptions +StdEnvVars 
  </Directory> 
 
  #   SSL Protocol Adjustments: 
   
  BrowserMatch "MSIE [2-6]" \ 
    nokeepalive ssl-unclean-shutdown \ 
    downgrade-1.0 force-response-1.0 
  # MSIE 7 and newer should be able to use keepalive 
  BrowserMatch "MSIE [17-9]" ssl-unclean-shutdown 
 
 </VirtualHost> 
</IfModule> 
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Appendix E – MySQL Security Protocols 
My.Conf enforcing TLS certifactes to communicate with WebServer 
# The MySQL database server configuration file. 
# This will be passed to all mysql clients 
# Remember to edit /etc/mysql/debian.cnf when changing the socket location. 
[client] 
port   = 3306 
socket  = /var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock 
 
# Here is entries for some specific programs 
# The following values assume you have at least 32M ram 
# This was formally known as [safe_mysqld]. Both versions are currently 
parsed. 
[mysqld_safe] 
socket  = /var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock 
nice   = 0 
 
[mysqld] 
 
# * Basic Settings 
user   = mysql 
pid-file  = /var/run/mysqld/mysqld.pid 
socket  = /var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock 
port   = 3306 
basedir  = /usr 
datadir  = /var/lib/mysql 
tmpdir  = /tmp 
lc-messages-dir = /usr/share/mysql 
skip-external-locking 
 
# Instead of skip-networking the default is now to listen only on 
# localhost which is more compatible and is not less secure. 
bind-address  = 127.0.0.1 
 
# * Fine Tuning 
key_buffer        = 16M 
max_allowed_packet = 16M 
thread_stack  = 192K 
thread_cache_size       = 8 
 
# This replaces the startup script and checks MyISAM tables if needed 
# the first time they are touched 
myisam-recover          = BACKUP 
#max_connections        = 100 
#table_cache            = 64 
#thread_concurrency     = 10 
 
# * Query Cache Configuration 
query_cache_limit = 1M 
query_cache_size        = 16M 
 
# * Logging and Replication 
# Both location gets rotated by the cronjob. 
general_log_file        = /var/log/mysql/mysql.log 
general_log             = 1 
 
# Error log - should be very few entries. 
log_error = /var/log/mysql/error.log 
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expire_logs_days = 10 
max_binlog_size         = 100M 
 
# * Security Features 
ssl-ciper=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA 
ssl-ca=/etc/mysql/ca-cert.pem 
ssl-cert=/etc/mysql/server-cert.pem 
ssl-key=/etc/mysql/server-key.pem 
 
[mysqldump] 
quick 
quote-names 
max_allowed_packet = 16M 
 
[isamchk] 
key_buffer   = 16M 
 
# * IMPORTANT: Additional settings that can override those from this file! 
#   The files must end with '.cnf', otherwise they'll be ignored. 
 
!includedir /etc/mysql/conf.d/ 
  
82 
 
Appendix E - ClearOS Configurations 
IP Tables 
#Default drop rule 
iptables -P INPUT DROP 
iptables -P FORWARD DROP 
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT 
# Flush (-F) all specific rules 
iptables -F INPUT  
iptables -F FORWARD  
iptables -F OUTPUT  
iptables -F -t nat 
#Forward internal network traffic 
iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -o eth0 -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A FORWARD -i eth2 -o eth0 -j ACCEPT 
#Allow and forward only established connections inbound 
iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o eth1 -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j 
ACCEPT 
iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o eth2 -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j 
ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth1 -s 0/0 -d 0/0 -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth2 -s 0/0 -d 0/0 -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -s 0/0 -d 0/0 -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A POSTROUTING -t nat -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
#Disallow traffic from external network with spoofed internal ip 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s 192.168.10.0/29-j DROP 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -192.168.30.0/30 -j DROP 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s 192.168.20.0/27 -j DROP 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s 127.0.0.0/8 -j DROP 
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Intrusion Detection System 
# Stop generic decode events: 
config disable_decode_alerts 
# Stop Alerts on experimental TCP options 
config disable_tcpopt_experimental_alerts 
# Stop Alerts on obsolete TCP options 
config disable_tcpopt_obsolete_alerts 
# Stop Alerts on T/TCP alerts 
config disable_tcpopt_ttcp_alerts 
# Stop Alerts on all other TCPOption type events: 
config disable_tcpopt_alerts 
# Stop Alerts on invalid ip options 
config disable_ipopt_alerts 
# Alert if value in length field (IP, TCP, UDP) is greater th elength of 
the packet 
#config enable_decode_oversized_alerts 
# Configure IP / TCP checksum mode 
config checksum_mode: all 
# Configure the base detection engine.  For more information, see  
README.decode 
# Configure PCRE match limitations 
config pcre_match_limit: 3500 
config pcre_match_limit_recursion: 1500 
# Configure the detection engine  See the Snort Manual, Configuring Snort - 
Includes - Config 
config detection: search-method ac-split search-optimize max-pattern-len 20 
# Configure the event queue.  For more information, see README.event_queue 
config event_queue: max_queue 8 log 5 order_events content_length 
# Configure protocol aware flushing 
config paf_max: 16000 
# Configure dynamic loaded libraries. 
# path to dynamic preprocessor libraries 
dynamicpreprocessor directory /usr/lib/snort_dynamicpreprocessor/ 
# Target-based IP defragmentation.  For more inforation, see README.frag3 
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preprocessor frag3_global: max_frags 65536 
preprocessor frag3_engine: policy windows detect_anomalies overlap_limit 10 
min_fragment_length 100 timeout 180 
# Target-Based stateful inspection/stream reassembly.  For more inforation, 
see README.stream5 
preprocessor stream5_global: track_tcp yes, \ 
   track_udp yes, \ 
   track_icmp no, \ 
   max_tcp 262144, \ 
   max_udp 131072, \ 
   max_active_responses 2, \ 
   min_response_seconds 5 
# path to base preprocessor engine 
dynamicengine /usr/lib/snort_dynamicengine/libsf_engine.so 
# performance statistics.  For more information, see the Snort Manual, 
Configuring Snort - Preprocessors - Performance Monitor 
# preprocessor perfmonitor: time 300 file /var/snort/snort.stats pktcnt 
10000 
# HTTP normalization and anomaly detection.  For more information, see 
README.http_inspect 
preprocessor http_inspect: global iis_unicode_map unicode.map 1252 
compress_depth 65535 decompress_depth 65535 
preprocessor http_inspect_server: server default \ 
http_methods { GET POST PUT SEARCH MKCOL COPY MOVE LOCK UNLOCK NOTIFY POLL 
BCOPY BDELETE BMOVE LINK UNLINK OPTIONS HEAD DELETE TRACE TRACK CONNECT 
SOURCE SUBSCRIBE UNSUBSCRIBE PROPFIND PROPPATCH BPROPFIND BPROPPATCH 
RPC_CONNECT PROXY_SUCCESS BITS_POST CCM_POST SMS_POST RPC_IN_DATA 
RPC_OUT_DATA RPC_ECHO_DATA } \ 
    chunk_length 500000 \ 
    server_flow_depth 0 \ 
    client_flow_depth 0 \ 
    post_depth 65495 \ 
    oversize_dir_length 500 \ 
    max_header_length 750 \ 
    max_headers 100 \ 
    max_spaces 200 \ 
    small_chunk_length { 10 5 } \ 
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ports { 36 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 311 383 555 591 593 631 801 808 
818 901 972 1158 1220 1414 1533 1741 1830 1942 2231 2301 2381 2809 2980 
3029 3037 3057 3128 3443 3702 4000 4343 4848 5000 5117 5250 5600 6080 6173 
6988 7000 7001 7071 7144 7145 7510 7770 7777 7778 7779 8000 8008 8014 8028 
8080 8081 8082 8085 8088 8090 8118 8123 8180 8181 8222 8243 8280 8300 8333 
8344 8500 8509 8800 8888 8899 8983 9000 9060 9080 9090 9091 9111 9290 9443 
9999 10000 11371 12601 13014 15489 29991 33300 34412 34443 34444 41080 
44449 50000 50002 51423 53331 55252 55555 56712 } \ 
    non_rfc_char { 0x00 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x04 0x05 0x06 0x07 } \ 
    enable_cookie \ 
    extended_response_inspection \ 
    inspect_gzip \ 
    normalize_utf \ 
    unlimited_decompress \ 
    normalize_javascript \ 
    apache_whitespace no \ 
    ascii no \ 
    bare_byte no \ 
    directory no \ 
    double_decode no \ 
# Back Orifice detection. 
preprocessor bo 
Portscan detection.  For more information, see README.sfportscan 
preprocessor sfportscan: proto  { all } memcap { 10000000 } sense_level { 
low } 
# ARP spoof detection.  For more information, see the Snort Manual - 
Configuring Snort - Preprocessors - ARP Spoof Preprocessor 
preprocessor arpspoof 
preprocessor arpspoof_detect_host: 192.168.40.1 f0:0f:00:f0:0f:00 
#Configure output plugins 
# syslog 
output alert_syslog: LOG_AUTHPRIV LOG_ALERT 
#Customize Rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/attack_response.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/chat.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/dns.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/exploit.rules 
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include $RULE_PATH/gpl/ftp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/imap.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/misc.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/p2p.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/pop3.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/rpc.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/scan.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/shellcode.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/smtp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/snmp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/sql.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/tftp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/web_client.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/web_server.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/gpl/web_specific_apps.rules 
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Appendix F – SmoothWall Iptables 
#Default drop rule 
iptables -P INPUT DROP 
iptables -P FORWARD DROP 
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT 
# Flush (-F) all specific rules 
iptables -F INPUT  
iptables -F FORWARD  
iptables -F OUTPUT  
iptables -F -t nat 
#Allow and forward only established connections inbound 
iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o eth1 -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j 
ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -i eth1 -s 0/0 -d 0/0 -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -s 0/0 -d 0/0 -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A POSTROUTING -t nat -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
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Appendix G - Metasploit Scans 
Ubuntu Server Metasploit Results 
Exploit Result 
exploit hagent_untrusted_hsdata  [-] No reply from the target, this is not  a vulnerable system 
exploit cuteflow_fileupload [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target appears to be vulnerable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/arkeia_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/awstats_configdir_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/awstatstotals_multisort  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/barracuda_img_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/base_qry_common  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/basilic_diff_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/carberp_backdoor_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/coppermine_piceditor  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/datalife_preview_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/egallery_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/flashchat_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/get_simple_cms_upload_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/google_proxystylesheet_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/graphite_pickle_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/hastymail_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USER, PASS. 
 Checking unix/webapp/havalite_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/horde_unserialize_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/instantcms_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking 
unix/webapp/invision_pboard_unserialize_exec  
[*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/libretto_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/mambo_cache_lite  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/mitel_awc_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/nagios_graph_explorer  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/narcissus_backend_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking 
unix/webapp/open_flash_chart_upload_exec  
[*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/openemr_sqli_privesc_upload  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USER, PASS. 
 Checking unix/webapp/openemr_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/opensis_modname_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/openx_banner_edit  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/oscommerce_filemanager  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/php_charts_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/php_vbulletin_template  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
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 Checking unix/webapp/php_wordpress_infusionsoft  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/php_wordpress_lastpost  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/php_xmlrpc_eval  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/phpmyadmin_config  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/projectpier_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/projectsend_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/redmine_scm_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking 
unix/webapp/simple_e_document_upload_exec  
[*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/skybluecanvas_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target appears to be vulnerable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/sphpblog_file_upload  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/squash_yaml_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/sugarcrm_unserialize_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/tuleap_unserialize_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/vbulletin_vote_sqli_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking 
unix/webapp/vicidial_manager_send_cmd_exec  
[*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/webtester_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/wp_admin_shell_upload  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking 
unix/webapp/wp_advanced_custom_fields_exec  
[*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking 
unix/webapp/wp_downloadmanager_upload  
[*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/wp_platform_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/wp_wptouch_file_upload  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
PASSWORD, USER. 
 Checking unix/webapp/xoda_file_upload  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/zeroshell_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/activecollab_chat  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USER, PASS. 
 Checking multi/http/ajaxplorer_checkinstall_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/apprain_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/auxilium_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/centreon_sqli_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/cisco_dcnm_upload  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/coldfusion_rds  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/http/contentkeeperweb_mimencode  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/dolibarr_cmd_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/dreambox_openpli_shell  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/esva_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/extplorer_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/fritzbox_echo_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/glossword_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/horde_href_backdoor  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
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 Checking multi/http/kordil_edms_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/linksys_wrt110_cmd_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/log1cms_ajax_create_folder  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/mobilecartly_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/mutiny_subnetmask_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/openx_backdoor_php  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/opmanager_socialit_file_upload  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/oracle_reports_rce  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/pandora_fms_sqli  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/pandora_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/php_cgi_arg_injection  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/phpldapadmin_query_engine  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/phpmoadmin_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/phpscheduleit_start_date  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/phptax_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/polarcms_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/qdpm_upload_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking linux/http/railo_cfml_rfi  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/sflog_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/sit_file_upload  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking linux/http/sophos_wpa_iface_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking multi/http/stunshell_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/sun_jsws_dav_options  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/symantec_web_gateway_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking 
linux/http/symantec_web_gateway_file_upload  
[*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/symantec_web_gateway_lfi  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/testlink_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/traq_plugin_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/v0pcr3w_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/vbseo_proc_deutf  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/vcms_upload  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/wanem_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking linux/http/webid_converter  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/webpagetest_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/wikka_spam_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD, PAGE. 
 Checking multi/http/x7chat2_php_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to validate: 
USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking multi/http/zabbix_script_exec  [*] 192.168.20.5:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
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ClearOS Metasploit Results 
Exploit Result 
f5_bigip_known_privkey [-] 192.168.30.17:22 SSH - Failed authentication 
loadbalancerorg_enterprise_known_privkey [-] 192.168.30.17:22 SSH - Failed authentication 
array_vxag_vapv_privkey_privesc [-] Exploit aborted due to failure: no-access: 192.168.30.17:22 SSH - 
Failed authentication 
array_vxag_vapv_privkey_privesc [-] Exploit aborted due to failure: no-access: 192.168.30.17:22 SSH - 
Failed authentication 
quantum_dxi_known_privkey [-] 192.168.30.17:22 SSH - Failed authentication 
quantum_vmpro_backdoor [-] 192.168.30.17:22 SSH - Failed authentication 
msf exploit(symantec_smg_ssh) > exploit -j [-] 192.168.30.17:22 SSH - Failed authentication 
tectia_passwd_changereq [*] 192.168.30.17:22 - Auths that can continue: 51 
ssh_login [*] Auxiliary module execution completed 
 
SmoothWall Metasploit Results 
Exploit Result 
 Checking multi/http/activecollab_chat  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USER, PASS. 
 Checking multi/http/ajaxplorer_checkinstall_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/apprain_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/auxilium_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/cisco_dcnm_upload  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/coldfusion_rds  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/http/contentkeeperweb_mimencode  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/cuteflow_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/dexter_casinoloader_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/extplorer_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/familycms_less_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/freenas_exec_raw  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/gitlab_shell_exec  [-] Exploit aborted due to failure: no-access: 
192.168.20.9:80 - Login failed 
 Checking multi/http/gitorious_graph  [*] The server returned: 301 Moved Permanently 
 Checking multi/http/glossword_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/ispconfig_php_exec  [-] Exploit aborted due to failure: Error getting initial 
page.: No reason given 
 Checking multi/http/kordil_edms_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/http/lifesize_room  [-] Exploit aborted due to failure: not-found: Could not 
obtain a Session ID 
 Checking multi/http/log1cms_ajax_create_folder  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/mobilecartly_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/mutiny_subnetmask_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/nas4free_php_exec  [-] Exploit aborted due to failure: Login failed 
 Checking multi/http/op5_license  [*] 192.168.20.9:443 - The target is not exploitable. 
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 Checking multi/http/openx_backdoor_php  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/opmanager_socialit_file_upload  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/oracle_reports_rce  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/pandora_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/php_cgi_arg_injection  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/php_volunteer_upload_exec  [-] 192.168.20.9:80 - Login failed with 
"admin:volunteer" 
 Checking multi/http/phpmoadmin_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/phpscheduleit_start_date  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/phptax_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/pmwiki_pagelist  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/polarcms_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/processmaker_exec  [-] 192.168.20.9:80 - Authenticating as user 'admin' 
failed 
 Checking multi/http/qdpm_upload_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking multi/http/rails_secret_deserialization  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: SECRET. 
 Checking multi/http/sflog_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/sit_file_upload  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking multi/http/stunshell_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/sun_jsws_dav_options  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/testlink_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/traq_plugin_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/http/twiki_debug_plugins  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/v0pcr3w_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/vbseo_proc_deutf  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/http/vmturbo_vmtadmin_exec_noauth  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/vtiger_php_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/webpagetest_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking multi/http/wikka_spam_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD, PAGE. 
 Checking multi/http/x7chat2_php_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/actualanalyzer_ant_cookie_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/awstats_migrate_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/barracuda_img_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/basilic_diff_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/carberp_backdoor_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/citrix_access_gateway_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:443 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/coppermine_piceditor  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/datalife_preview_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/dogfood_spell_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/egallery_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/freepbx_config_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
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 Checking unix/webapp/get_simple_cms_upload_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/google_proxystylesheet_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/graphite_pickle_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/hastymail_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USER, PASS. 
 Checking unix/webapp/havalite_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/horde_unserialize_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/instantcms_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/invision_pboard_unserialize_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/libretto_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/mybb_backdoor  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/narcissus_backend_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/open_flash_chart_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/openemr_sqli_privesc_upload  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USER, PASS. 
 Checking unix/webapp/opensis_modname_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/openx_banner_edit  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/php_charts_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/php_vbulletin_template  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/php_xmlrpc_eval  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/phpbb_highlight  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/projectpier_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/redmine_scm_exec  [*] The server returned: 301 Moved Permanently 
 Checking unix/webapp/seportal_sqli_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/simple_e_document_upload_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/skybluecanvas_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/sphpblog_file_upload  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/squash_yaml_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/sugarcrm_unserialize_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/tikiwiki_graph_formula_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/tikiwiki_jhot_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/tuleap_unserialize_exec  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/vbulletin_vote_sqli_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/vicidial_manager_send_cmd_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/webtester_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/wp_admin_shell_upload  [-] Check failed: The following options failed to 
validate: USERNAME, PASSWORD. 
 Checking unix/webapp/wp_platform_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/xoda_file_upload  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
 Checking unix/webapp/zeroshell_exec  [*] 192.168.20.9:80 - The target is not exploitable. 
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Appendix H – Nikto Vulnerability Scan 
- Nikto v2.1.4  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
+ Target IP:          127.0.0.1  
+ Target Hostname:    localhost  
+ Target Port:        80  
+ Start Time:         2015-04-26 21:11:04  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
+ Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)  
+ Root page / redirects to: https://localhost/  
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)  
+ OSVDB-27071: /phpimageview.php?pic=javascript:alert(8754): PHP Image View 1.0 is vulnerable to Cross 
Site Scripting (XSS).  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html.  
+ OSVDB-3931: /myphpnuke/links.php?op=search&query=[script]alert('Vulnerable);[/script]?query=: 
myphpnuke is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS). http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html.  
+ OSVDB-3931: 
/myphpnuke/links.php?op=MostPopular&ratenum=[script]alert(document.cookie);[/script]&ratetype=percent
: myphpnuke is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS). http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html.  
+ 
/modules.php?op=modload&name=FAQ&file=index&myfaq=yes&id_cat=1&categories=%3Cimg%20src=javasc
ript:alert(9456);%3E&parent_id=0: Post Nuke 0.7.2.3-Phoenix is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS). 
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html.  
+ 
/modules.php?letter=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src=javascript:alert(document.cookie);%3E&op=modload&name=M
embers_List&file=index: Post Nuke 0.7.2.3-Phoenix is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS). 
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html.  
+ OSVDB-4598: /members.asp?SF=%22;}alert('Vulnerable');function%20x(){v%20=%22: Web Wiz Forums ver. 
7.01 and below is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS). http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html.  
+ OSVDB-2946: /forum_members.asp?find=%22;}alert(9823);function%20x(){v%20=%22: Web Wiz Forums ver. 
7.01 and below is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS). http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html.  
+ 6448 items checked: 0 error(s) and 7 item(s) reported on remote host  
+ End Time:           2015-04-26 21:11:22 (18 seconds)  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
+ 1 host(s) tested  
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Appendix I – Table of Requirements 
Build and Maintain a Secure Network and Systems 
Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data 
Implementation and configuration ClearOS and Smoothwall Router/Firewalls at integral network 
points. 
Network Diagram from planning section.  
Firewall configurations ensure no direct access to CDE from outside networks and ensures all traffic 
to CDE is only allowed on established connections.  
Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameters 
Removal of default usernames and passwords on OS installation. 
Removal of default usernames and passwords for databases and wireless connections. 
Implementation of CIS hardening standards. 
Network protocols are limited to only those required for functionality.  
Protect Cardholder Data 
Protect stored cardholder data 
Salting and Hashing of sensitive information stored in database. 
Three digit verification number not stored.  
Implementation of strong cryptographic keys (RSA). Keys are also given limited lifespan and 
rendered useless when expired.  
Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks 
Implementing TLS to secure communications. 
Wireless connections secured via WPA2 wireless connections, encrypted with AES. 
Maintain a Vulnerability Management Program 
Protect all systems against malware and regularly update anti-virus software or programs 
Installation of anti-virus and anti-malware software on network.  
Develop and maintain secure systems and application 
Static code analysis conducted to evaluate weaknesses in the code base. 
Code base strengthened by implementing necessary secure coding measures as required by the scan 
results.  
Implement Strong Access Control Measures 
Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know 
Cardholder can only be accessed by two administrative users.  
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These users both have different functionality and do not have the same access levels, so only one 
user can complete one task either server maintenance or data removal as required.  
Base access control rules implemented to deny all. 
Identify and authenticate access to system components 
User groups implemented with access levels as required for job functionality 
Users automatically assigned a unique ID. 
Accounts disabled after 3 month period if not accessed.  
Accounts locked out after 5 unsuccessful log in attempts. 
Password requirements set to include strength and lifecycle limitations. 
Restrict physical access to cardholder data  
Could not be implemented due to the nature of the testing environment.  
Regularly Monitor and Test Networks 
Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data 
Logging implemented on all network devices to track access. 
Regularly test security systems and processes 
Completion of: 
Network Communications Testing 
Vulnerability Analysis 
Wireless Testing 
Penetration Testing 
Maintain an Information Security Policy 
Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all personnel 
Authentication required for security personnel. 
All devices on the network listed in network diagram. 
Wireless access points also listed in network diagram. 
 
